EUGENE GOODHEART: THE NEW CONSERVATISM

THE NATION

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The Case for Effective Control
H. H. Wilson

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Frank J. Donner

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LETTERS

revolution against heresy

Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIRS: Thank you very much for publishing Ronald Sampson's "Power: The Enshrined Heresy" [Jan. 4]. It is a truly revolutionary and human document; all the more revolutionary because human. I hope it will be widely read among all people, particularly the young, who, seeing our corrupt and cruel and destructive societies are almost paralyzed with anger and despair. *John Holt*

are we different?

Chappaqua, N.Y.

DEAR SIRS: If, as Prof. Mark Sacharoff says ["War Crimes: Made in U.S.A.," *The Nation,* Jan. 25], "At least 8 million South Vietnamese, nearly half the population, have been killed, wounded or displaced since the start of the war," and if, as he says, this appalling toll is a direct result of U.S. strategic policy, what is the difference between American operations in Vietnam and German operations under the Nazis?

Editorialists twenty-five to thirty years ago did a good deal of strafing of the Germans for not objecting to what was happening. Yet, according to a recent Gallup poll, President Nixon was rated by 57 per cent of the population as the "most admired man" in the United States. And Nixon, as anyone can see with half an eye, has no more intention of terminating the war than Hitler had of halting the Final Solution.

Can it be that "we," pro or contra the Pentagon politicians, are no better and no more the children of light than the often belabored Germans? Where now are the doughty editorial writers who denounced the Germans for heading like homing pigeons for jobs in the war industries—now when American war industries are touted as a main national economic support?

Are apologies due the Germans, especially the Nazis, from the always liberty loving American press?

Ferdinand Lundberg

up from slavery?

San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: John McMurtry's analysis of football is not only splendid but also correct. ["Philosophy of a Corner Linebacker," *The Nation,* Jan. 18.] But he doesn't realize that things are changing in the racial aspect. A friend of mine, watching a football game at his enlightened university, related that a 10-gallon white Stetson turned to him to inquire, "Did you see what our colored boy did to that nigger?"

This is another example of the principle of "possession" which McMurtry says is the key to football. But it is progress, ain't it? *Norman Reider, M.D.*

mistaken identity

Santa Monica, Calif.

DEAR SIRS: In his excellent article "The Politics of Pain" [*The Nation,* Jan. 4] V. G. Kiernan mentions "Rakoczi's Hungary." The Rákóczys were a powerful Hungarian family and Ferencz Rákóczy (1676-1735) is even now revered as the leader of the Hungarian revolt against the Hapsburgs. Mathias Rákosi introduced a much hated Stalinist rule in Hungary which was ended by the 1956 counterrevolution. He fled to the Soviets, returned to Budapest recently, but had to return again to Russia.

It is "Rákosi's" (not "Rakoczi's") Hungary Kiernan meant to write about, and a correction is called for. Apart from this the Jan. 4th issue was one of your best. How can people exist without *The Nation*? *E. H. Neuwald*

EDITORIALS

The President's Problem

The President's State of the Union proposals which h himself billed in advance as "the most comprehensive the most far-reaching, the most bold program in th domestic field ever presented to the American Congress' invite detailed comment which we intend to give them But this week comment will be confined to the politic of the program and a phase of the reorganization pro posal that is of immediate interest.

As to the politics, the President clearly intends to rur against the record of the Democratic-controlled Congress which he assumes will fail to enact major aspects of hi program. The assumption is probably correct. Some o the proposals are extremely vague; others invite substan tial criticism. As a whole the program seems to assume that the war in Vietnam has been concluded. Even if the Democrats react as the President assumes, it does no follow that he will be successful in adopting the tactic Mr. Truman used to such good effect in the 1948 campaign. The Nixon program is not all that irresistible, the level of unemployment may remain high, the war in Indochina may drag on and the Vietnamization schedule may be set back. But there is a more basic reason why the President's political game plan may not succeed.

With President Johnson, the issue of credibility was simple. It became increasingly difficult to believe what he said about the war. But the personality of the President was credible; there was never any uncertainty or inconsistency on that score. When he sipped beer from a can while zooming down the highway, or pulled the ears of his dogs, or exhibited his surgical scars, he was acting as Lyndon Baines Johnson might be expected to act. It is even more difficult to believe what President Nixon has to say about the war, but in addition he lacks credibility as a person. Just who *is* Nixon, really? He promised to bring us together and told us to lower our voices. But before long he was baiting the peace movement and impugning the motives of his critics. He deliberately "unleashed" Agnew last year and then, to make his meaning clear, engaged in some old-style Nixon rough stuff in the final phase of the campaign. After expressing clear disapproval of the Scranton Commission report, he then began to say kind things about students. His State of the Union speech was concerned, conciliatory and nonpartisan in tone. But Murray Chotiner has been released for various political chores and the abrasive Senator Dole now heads the Republican National Committee; neither man is concerned, conciliatory or nonpartisan. At the outset the President was a budget balancer; now he is a Keynesian.

Many voters find such quick changes disconcerting. A Columbus, Ohio, resident writes to *The New York Times*: "Does the President really believe that memory fades so quickly?" The Detroit wife of an office worker complains in an interview with James M. Naughton in the *Times* that the President "isn't real and his family isn't real either." More important, the President confuses even the constituency that has been his most consistent source of support. David S. Broder reports that right-

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ing backers are increasingly nervous about him. One ın readily imagine the reactions of Henry Salvatori, ɛnator Tower and Senator Goldwater to the State of ıe Union proposals. Even if they assume that the Presiɛnt is just playing politics, they must regard Republican ıdorsement of some of these proposals with deep conɛrn. The Vice President himself is said to be "increasıgly disenchanted." Hence there is a real danger, noted y Alan L. Otten in *The Wall Street Journal,* that the resident's approach "may actually narrow support—ɜtranging liberals with his conservative moves, conseratives with the liberal ones, and middle-of-the-roaders ·ith a seemingly unprincipled zigzagging." Still more imortant, the President must feel uneasy about some of his resent proposals, for as Stewart Alsop has pointed out, Mr. Nixon is really well to the right of President Nixon"; e is now in the odd position of being "to the left of himɛlf." When President Truman launched his famous ·histle-stop campaign against those "no-good, do-nothing" .epublicans, he was entirely convincing and quite in character. Mr. Nixon's problem is that he is never in character r, to put it another way, he keeps adopting different perɔnas as need arises, as though it really didn't matter beause the public doesn't notice or doesn't care. Say what ou will, this is his ineluctable problem and it happens to e one for which there is no remedy.

The Place To Begin

In his State of the Union message, heralded by Attorney ɔeneral Mitchell as "the most important document since hey wrote the Constitution," President Nixon has trotted ıut that fine old perennial, the need to reform the federal ·ureaucracy in the name of efficiency and better manageıent. The need is obvious but Mr. Nixon is unrealistic ı his proposal to pare down the twelve present Cabinet ɔepartments to eight. Such Departments as Labor, Transıortation and Agriculture have powerful lobbies and ·ested interests behind them which are by no means allɔemocratic or all-Republican in composition. One may ıpplaud what Mr. Nixon says about the need for reorganiɜation but question that he seriously believes his scheme s realistic from a practical political point of view.

But there is a special reason for doubting his *bona ides* about the reorganization proposal. The four Departnents he proposes to leave untouched are Defense, State, Treasury and Justice. Forget Treasury and Justice for the noment. State is probably in greater need of reorganizaion than any Cabinet department, with the possible ɛxception of the Department of Defense. State at least loes little harm; it is simply otiose, but the Defense ɔepartment's recklessness, waste and duplicity are clear ınd present dangers. Closely related to State and Defense s that vast, sprawling conglomerate known as the Intelliɡence Establishment. It costs $5 billion annually or more —no one can even approximate the amount, such is the umble of obfuscation and duplication which it has ıchieved. The Bay of Pigs was merely an egregious inɜtance of the blunders of which it is capable. The ɔrisoners-of-war raid furnishes a recent example. It was ɛonducted without effective liaison with the Central Intelliɡence Agency for reasons best known to military intelli-

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gence. If the CIA had been closely consulted the operation might not have turned out any better, but the fact remains that its only role was that of a bystander. The latest offense of Army Intelligence—spying on civilians—is merely a prize illustration of the need for close supervision and control of the entire intelligence establishment. No one seems to be able to ride herd on this vast scattered and uncoordinated bureaucracy. For example, no one seems to know quite how military intelligence got into the business of spying on civilians. If anyone has a chance of coping with the intelligence establishment it is the President. Executive orders, not new legislation, would be all that was needed to achieve a greater measure of efficiency and economy.

Here is one specific illustration. Sen. Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) reveals that the CIA has spent several hundred million dollars to keep those two cold-war monstrosities, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, broadcasting from Munich, ostensibly bringing vital information to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Both organizations masquerade as private bodies and appeal for public donations. The Advertising Council lends a hand by securing free media time valued at between $12 million and $20 million in order to bring in a paltry $100,000 in public contributions. At the same time the myth is sedulously cultivated that both organizations are sustained by large corporate donations. The fact is, of course, that the CIA comes across with $30 million a year. The President could, if he would, put a stop to this expensive deception.

Even the intelligence bureaucrats are somewhat appalled by the present situation. "Trying to draw up an organization chart is a nightmare," one senior aide is quoted as saying. "No one person seems to be in charge. . . . Whoever winds up running this thing is clearly going to have to be someone with the President's confidence." Here, clearly, is the place for the President to apply his zeal for bureaucratic reform and managerial reorganization.

Not Quite Invulnerable

For years J. Edgar Hoover has been regarded as "the invulnerable bureaucrat," who cannot be asked to resign or removed from office and who enjoys bipartisan immunity from criticism of any kind. When some time back he indirectly slandered Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans, he was mildly taken to task by Rep. Edward Roybal (D., Calif.), who is of Mexican-American background. Immediately, several of Mr. Roybal's colleagues sprang to the defense of the Director and that same evening President Nixon spoke up for him on a nationally televised program.

When more recently Rep. William R. Anderson (D., Tenn.) drew a standing ovation at a meeting of the general board of the National Council of Churches for his spirited renewed defense of the Berrigans, he was promptly taken to task by Vice President Agnew for "popping off for political reasons," although the duel began when Hoover popped off about the Harrisburg "conspiracy" before an indictment had been returned.

Last week two lawyers from the Department of Justice, Robert Murphy and Michael Abbell, spoke at the Drake University Law School. In an excellent report John Swee of UPI quoted Murphy as saying that Hoover woul probably remain as Director until the new FBI buildin —which he said would no doubt be named after Hoove —had been completed. Then, he thought, Hoover shoul "fittingly" retire. Mr. Abbell was more critical. He wa quoted as saying that Hoover's premature comments abou the "conspiracy" had severely damaged the investigatio and dried up whatever sources the government may hav had. The moment this story appeared, the Attorney Gen eral demanded personal reports from the two lawyers who were at Drake as part of Mr. Mitchell's plan to open a dialogue with students. No doubt the students have noted how this particular dialogue terminated.

One could cite other evidence of the extraordinary way in which the highest ranking officials apparently feel an obligation, or compulsion, not merely to protect Mr. Hoover's lifetime tenure—by virtue of special Presidential dispensations he has already stayed on six years beyond the mandatory retirement age—but to defend him against any whiff of criticism. Not surprisingly a British humor magazine once suggested that Hoover might well be regarded as the "king of America" but for the fact that he is a bachelor and, at his age, unlikely to have heirs.

Yet the strong support given the priests and nuns in the Harrisburg case by their superiors, now matched by the American Friends Service Committee's unequivocal support of William Davidon—a "co-conspirator"—as well as the criticism of Mr. Roybal and Mr. Anderson, and mounting attacks in the press on Hoover's handling of the John F. Shaw case (see p. 172 this issue), suggest that the icon is beginning to chip at the edges. In strong editorials the Charleston *Gazette* and the Cleveland *Plain Dealer*, among other papers, have said that Mr. Hoover has "overstayed his usefulness" and should step down, even before the building which will be his monument if not his final resting place has been completed. Quoting a student paper edited by a New York policeman at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the *Plain Dealer* reminds Mr. Hoover "that any institution which holds itself above criticism will soon drift beyond the realm of reality." It is becoming increasingly clear that this is where Mr. Hoover, who is of course an "institution," has drifted.

After Twenty Years

In a speech at the University of the Pacific, Sen. George S. McGovern took on a subject which, as one reporter said, has been taboo among leading politicians for two decades. With the ultimate in daring, he proposed that the United States recognize Communist China. Thus he risked being tinged with some of the Red that mainland China exudes on all who look in its direction without overt fear and loathing.

Yet, though he has invited contagion, no one will dare to dispute McGovern. The Nixon Administration won't, for at least two reasons. It has moved cautiously toward contact with Peking in the first half of Mr. Nixon's first term, so the difference it has with McGovern's proposal mainly is one of degree. Second, if Nixon went after McGovern's scalp on this issue, McGovern might begin

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quoting Nixon as of 1952 and subsequent years. The official GOP line was that the Democrats had "lost" China. On that point Sen. Joe McCarthy and respectable Republicans were agreed. Then, primed with wishful thinking, the cold-war dogma stated that while China had been lost, it could be regained. The Communists did not really control the mainland. Unleashed, Chiang Kai-shek could cross the Strait of Formosa and free the wretched Chinese people from their oppressors. If these fables were put back into Nixon's mouth, with the China Lobby stone dead and the U.N. veering toward admission of Peking, Nixon could be made to look like a fool, although really all he was guilty of was demagogy. The same applies to those surviving Democrats who espoused the McCarthy-Nixon line when it seemed to be good politics.

So now McGovern is free to say that the time has come "to dispel the fogs and myths which have for the past twenty years befuddled our attitudes and our actions toward mainland China," myths which he called "the most costly and dangerous untruths in American public policy." This vital correction includes not only recognition but forgoing construction of an ABM system designed to nullify what is clearly a Chinese deterrent force, putting trade with China on the same basis as trade with European Communist nations, promoting broad scientific and cultural exchanges and admission of China to the U.N. as a permanent member of the Security Council, with Nationalist China relegated to membership in the General Assembly.

Of course all these developments are in the future; not too much must be expected in the present in the way of trade, for instance. Communist China's total foreign trade is of the order of $4 billion, as compared with Formosa's $3 billion. Second, when it comes to recognizing Peking, there is a right way and a wrong way. The British "recognized" Peking about 1950 and there still has been no exchange of ambassadors. The French were more astute. They negotiated in advance and then recognized. The result was an exchange of ambassadors and general reciprocity. Canada followed the same course, as did Italy. That is the way to go about it.

The whole history of post-World War II U.S.-China relations is a prime example of our facility in pulling the wool over our own eyes. It took twenty years before one man came along with the honesty, intelligence and courage to say publicly what nearly everyone has agreed with privately since the days of John Foster Dulles.

Too Fine a Record

The Democratic Party in California is in the throes of reorganization at the moment, which perhaps accounts for the fact that Charles Manett, a Los Angeles businessman and principal organizer of Senator Tunney's successful campaign, defeated George E. Brown, Jr., for the post of party chairman. At the same time Assemblyman Bob Moretti, another Tunney supporter, has been elected Speaker of the Assembly. The vote on the state chairmanship was close: 428 to 418. It is an indication—but only an indication—of the relative strength of the right-of-center elements (who supported Manett) and the left-of-center elements (who supported Brown).

Elected to Congress in 1962, Mr. Brown continued to represent the 29th Congressional District until he decided to seek the Democratic nomination for the Senate, only to be edged out by Senator Tunney. The state chairmanship is not a post of awesome responsibility, or much power, so the outcome of the Manett-Brown contest does not have much overall significance. But it would be most unfortunate if, as a result of his defeat, Mr. Brown decided to withdraw from politics. He was an admirable Representative in Congress. On virtually every count his record in the House was superior to that of Tunney. Indeed, one of the reasons Brown lost the Senatorial nomination is that he had, from a liberal-progressive point of view, a record of such excellence that it put off those who somehow distrust consistency and courage in a politician. He was one of the earliest, and certainly one of the most consistent, critics of the war in Vietnam. We still recall with pride an article he did for *The Nation*: "A Congressman Speaks to the President: 'I Am Tired of Your Gimmicks'" (December 11, 1967). At that time it took political courage for a Democratic Congressman to address a Democratic President in such a blunt and forthright manner. Perhaps now that he is, for the moment, not so preoccupied with politics, he can be induced to do another piece for us.

Pity the Birds

Oil is rapidly becoming an ecological menace of the first order. Edward Cowan studied the *Torrey Canyon* disaster of 1967 exhaustively, wrote a book about it, and predicted in *The Nation,* "Mankind's Fouled Nest—Oil on the Waters" [March 10, 1969] that further trouble was on the way as a consequence of more and ever larger tankers plying seas, straits and harbors. The prophecy has turned out to be all too true. Within the past few days, two Standard Oil tankers collided in the fog off the Golden Gate Bridge and floated into the bay, one of them dumping perhaps 2 million gallons of heavy bunker oil into the bay. Standard Oil expressed deep regrets and sprang into action to minimize the damage, but the president of the Sierra Club demanded a $1-million-a-day fine. Thousands of Bay Area ecologists worked in a forlorn effort to save the waterfowl caught in the sticky mess. Experience shows that despite all efforts, 90 per cent of the birds will die.

At about the same time, in Long Island Sound off New Haven, 385,000 gallons of fuel oil poured from an Esso tanker that ran aground in the harbor. For the time being, the slick was held offshore by an ice barrier. In the English Channel, an oil tanker collided with a smaller ship, broke in two and sank with a loss of nine lives, after which a freighter rammed into the wreckage of the tanker and twenty-one more lives were lost.

The increasing traffic in oil poses a major menace, the future dimensions of which are of frightening proportions. To cite only two indicators of what lies ahead, Japan imports practically all its crude oil supplies, and nearly all comes from the Middle East in tankers. When Alaskan oil is piped from the North Slope to Valdez on the Gulf of Alaska, it will be transported in tankers through waters that are not the safest in the world. The pipeline itself

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may break and cause oil spills, and coastwise tanker traffic on a large scale is another possible spill source.

The San Francisco case will provide a test of the legislation which Senator Muskie managed to push through after four and a half years of effort; it was finally signed into law on April 3, 1970. It sets up a $35 million contingency fund for accidents of this type in inland and territorial waters. Using this reserve, the government can clean up the damage and collect from the company or companies involved, but with a limitation in the amount of $100 per gross tonnage up to a maximum of $14 million. Liability is presumed unless the accident was the result of an act of war, an act of God as understood in the legal sense, the negligence of a third party, or the negligence of the U.S. Government itself. None of these avoidances appears to apply in the San Francisco case.

But other issues remain. Senator Muskie was in effect forced to trade limitation in damage claims for a strong statement of liability. But the damages, in such accidents, can run much higher than the present limitations and the contingency fund itself is inadequate. As tankers grow larger and more numerous, the existing legislation should be strengthened. There is also the question of what is to be done to improve operating procedures, in terms of personnel and equipment and prudent navigation, to avoid accidents in which tankers are involved. Similar considerations apply, of course, to offshore drilling and pipeline operations. The need for further Congressional attention to the hazards of oil pollution is at once obvious and urgent. More is at stake here than birds or fish, of course; rents are being made in the web of life upon which man depends, and of which he is a part.

NEW POLITICS IN MICHIGAN

GRASS ROOTS *vs.* BACK ROOM

SUSAN HOLTZER

Miss Holtzer is a free-lance writer, active in the New Democratic Coalition of Michigan (previously in the Conference of Concerned Democrats). She is also a member of the Michigan Democratic State Central Committee and a former staff editor of Michigan Daily.

Ann Arbor

In 1972 Michigan may be one of the major battlegrounds of the persistent attack on the American two-party system. In this state, conservatives and liberals will both mount determined attacks on the two major parties; each will have a party of its own on the ballot in time for the November election.

The outgoing Republican state Senator, Robert Huber, had begun to shape his conservative organization even before he was defeated by Lenore Romney for his party's Senatorial nomination last summer. The liberal entry, to be called the Human Rights Party (HRP), was created late in November of last year by a group of Democratic dissidents led by former state party chairman Zolton Ferency. [See Douglas Crase, *The Nation,* December 1, 1969.]

You cannot write about the political Left in Michigan without writing about Ferency. Three times elected Democratic Party state chairman; defeated by George Romney for governor in 1966; defeated by state Sen. Sander Levin in the gubernatorial primary in 1970; the leader (dissatisfied) of the McCarthy forces in Michigan in 1968; twenty years a professional politician—in all, and without contest, Ferency is the champion of the Democratic Left in his state.

He is perhaps the only politician in Michigan with a dedicated personal following. The Ferency cult, incomprehensible to outsiders, perpetually astonishes and maddens the Democratic regulars. To his adherents, he is the man who was willing to lay his political life on the line over the war in Vietnam; the only party leader willing to take on Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey; the man who would not compromise.

Forming a new political party is a logical step in Ferency's consistent attitude toward American politics. In an era of candidate-centered elections and growing nonpartisanship, he continues to believe that programmatic political parties should form the basis of the political system. He rejects both the umbrella party and "image" politics. Ferency believes in a strong party, but one controlled by a membership that is able to impose a clear, issues-based and representative platform on its elected officials.

In this, as even he admits, he is standing against the tide. But he insists that the electorate increasingly rejects political parties because they stand for nothing and haven't the power to accomplish even such muddy goals as they profess.

Besides Ferency, the other significant element in the Michigan Left—and in the Human Rights Party—is the New Democratic Coalition in the state. Formed as the Michigan Conference of Concerned Democrats early in 1967, the coalition is not yet four years old, but shows signs of political senescence. Indeed, the major thrust for a new party comes from NDC dissidents. Nearly all of HRP's founders have worked in, or with, the coalition, but have become disenchanted with NDC—some with its effectiveness, others with its continued link to the Democratic Party.

NDC has always been party-oriented; its initial purpose was specifically to serve as a liberal caucus within the Democratic Party, and a countervailing force to the party influence of the United Automobile Workers in this union-dominated state. Its founders were working Democrats; its format was a shadow structure of the party; its goal was a voice in, and reform of, the party.

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The earliest and strongest objections to this orientation came from the same areas most heavily represented in the HRP—a combination of suburbia and academia. The new party derives its main strength at this moment primarily from the university communities of Ann Arbor and Lansing/East Lansing, from the white suburbs north of Detroit, and from scattered white areas within the city itself.

Of the multiple medium-sized cities scattered throughout the state, only Flint, dominated by General Motors and the UAW, has produced any real push for a new party. Among NDC leaders, at least, in Kalamazoo, St. Joseph/Benton Harbor, Muskegon, Bay City/Saginaw,

Zolton Ferency

and others, there is little enthusiasm and some outright antagonism to the HRP movement.

It enjoys, of course, some individual support scattered throughout the state, but its real power can be defined in just this semi-geographic way. Geography, a consistent political element in the state, has produced a kind of fault line within NDC itself.

Michigan's Democratic vote—and, therefore, its strong Democratic organizations—are concentrated in Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties, what is called the tri-county area in the southeastern part of the state. In that area, where the votes, the jobs and the political power lie, the party is strong, tightly controlled, and heavily larded with UAW influence. There, in convention after convention, NDC members have been put down, put down and sometimes put out, by leadership that clearly had no intention of sharing the wealth. District by district, the more exclusionist the party organization, the more sympathy was generated for a total pullout from the party.

Elsewhere in the state, however, there is little wealth to share; in heavily Republican areas, the Democratic Party is often a mere skeleton force. In county after county NDC members, who were willing to put in any amount of work, found themselves welcomed with open arms. Often, twenty people or fewer represented a working majority of the local party organization and because they found a political vacuum at the top, NDC was able to make a real impact on the party, taking effective control in several counties. At the very least, they have been getting their fair share of the Democratic action outside the tri-county area.

There is also little black interest in a new party—and that was predictable, for Michigan's highly politicized black community has been doing well with the Democrats for some time. The state was the first in the country to have two black Congressmen; it has a new black Secretary of State; more elected black officials then any other state, and blacks are fully represented at all levels of the Democratic Party. Most important of all, black Democrats in Michigan are their own leaders; they are not white-dominated. They are not inclined to risk these very substantial gains, nor do they particularly trust the New Left, which has been, in Michigan as elsewhere, strong on rhetoric but short on visible black participation.

Again as elsewhere, black politicians are bitter over the white liberal strategy of defeating unacceptable Democrats at the price of electing conservatives. The problem is particularly exacerbating in Michigan, where the Democratic Congressional delegation tends to be hawkish—with some exceptions, and pro-military, yet consistently liberal on domestic issues—frequently, far to the Left of its constituents. If the legislators vote for military appropriations, they also vote for welfare reform, and the black community, unlike many whites, is generally disinclined to risk losing everything to the hope of gaining something.

The Michigan NDC has actively solicited black participation in the organization, supported and encouraged black demands within the party, and even supported unpalatable white Democrats to avoid hurting a statewide ticket which included three black candidates. But the pull of opposing white and black strategies, even though directed toward similar ideological goals, was already proving a strain to the organization.

In conventions and party primaries, NDC represents between a third and a fourth of the Michigan Democratic Party. Ferency got 29 per cent of the primary vote for governor in 1970; convention votes on NDC issues and personnel run about the same; and they elected about that percentage of party delegates in the 1970 elections. Nor has it been split and factionalized to any great degree; Michigan NDC has, until now, been able to avoid the usual self-cannibalizing of the political Left.

Still, Democratic regulars have been unwilling to give

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the organization a voice at the top levels. The ultimate fiasco in this regard came in early 1969, when the outgoing Democratic chairman, Sander Levin, promised NDC Chairman Al Fishman two newly created positions as Democratic Party officers-at-large. Whereupon, the new party leadership informed NDC that, yes, they could have the positions—but that the party would do the selecting, and that NDC's *five* top spokesman, including Fishman and Ferency, would not be acceptable. The outcome was that the party elected two NDC members over NDC's objections, and informed the organization that it was to consider itself "represented."

HRP founders maintain, with much justice, that this sort of futility has marked most of NDC's attempts to play the back-room political game. And they are almost as disgusted with NDC as with the party itself. NDC, successful enough in scattered districts, has not been able to cut itself in on the Democratic action at the state level. But the most damning charge made against it by HRP is that it has failed to accomplish the grass-roots organizing to which it was dedicated. They accuse NDC, at one and the same time, of lacking strong leadership, of having become elitist, and of selling out to the Democratic Party.

HRP's functional strategy will be to organize around local as well as broader issues, and its people are determined to avoid a top-heavy structure. Ferency has pointed out that, under Michigan election law, a minor party needs only two elected officers—a chairman and a secretary—and they are not inclined to have more than that. It is to be the ultimate grass-roots movement.

The party's plans also include the ultimate white liberal political strategy—that of the spoiler. In Michigan it will, without question, be used as a threat to the Democratic Party in the Senatorial election of 1972. Republican Sen. Robert Griffin, for all his national image, is considered ripe for the taking; the man most often named as his likely opponent is state Atty. Gen. Frank Kelley, anathema to the Michigan Left. Sander Levin is also prominently mentioned.

It is certain that if either of those men wins the Democratic nomination, Zolton Ferency will be on the HRP ballot for the same office. Every Democrat in the state knows it, even if Ferency is not yet ready to make it official.

In addition to the Senate race, there are many state and local elections in which HRP candidates are likely to run. And even those who are unenthusiastic about the new party are glad it will be available if the Democratic Presidential nominee is unacceptable.

Getting a new party on the ballot is simple in Michigan; HRP needs only 15,000 petition signatures. But while the state's election law makes filing a new party easy, it makes using the accreditation difficult. To begin, while it is not illegal for a candidate to run on two parties simultaneously, the two sets of votes cannot be cumulatively totaled. That effectively eliminates the prospect of running someone in both the Democratic and Human Rights Parties. Further, the law does not allow a losing primary candidate to run for the same office in the same election on another party ticket. In other words, if Ferency were to lose in the Democratic Senatorial primary, it would be impossible for him to then run for the Senate on the HRP ticket.

Ferency believes both of these provisions are probably unconstitutional, and they may be challenged in court in 1972. Meanwhile, they pose a real barrier to a combined Democratic-HRP campaign—which is what many people want.

For the new party is still a threat rather than a promise. Many HRP people intend to continue their roles in the Democratic Party—and, so long as they are elected delegates, there is no way the Democrats can purge them. Many also intend to continue in NDC, and use the new party as a further threat to gain recognition for that organization.

On the other hand, several NDC leaders have complained for some time that they cannot get committed radicals to work for an organization allied to the Democratic Party. A group of faculty members from Michigan State University, for instance, was willing and able to raise money for liberal state legislative candidates, but refused to funnel it through NDC's Legislative Committee because it was connected with the party. For people like that, HRP may provide a political avenue.

How far this left-wing mélange will get is anybody's guess. If it is true in politics that the more you do the more people you attract, HRP may be instrumental in bringing new blood into Michigan's political Left. But it is equally true that multiple organizations fragment power and potentially, at least, provide for the sort of internecine warfare that has doomed so many liberal movements.

NDC, backed to the wall, has uttered nothing but welcoming words to the new party; but behind the press releases many leaders are distinctly unhappy, and some are quite openly bitter. It means, after four years of fighting to prevent it, a real split in the liberal ranks; it means a dual leadership structure that will inhibit the coordination of liberal activities. To many, it means a great deal of wasted effort.

For by no means every Michigan liberal agrees that a new party is an effective tactic, even for a limited purpose. A sizable number still believe Democratic primaries *can* be won, if the job is begun early enough and done properly. They claim that NDC's abysmal showing in the 1970 primaries was the result of too little and too late. These people foresee that the new party will siphon off money and manpower needed to get candidates onto the Democratic ticket, where they can be elected.

Meanwhile, party regulars seem generally unconcerned. When the Conference of Concerned Democrats announced its formation in 1967, the party burst immediately into print with charges, defensive maneuvers and, in general, all the symptoms of political alarm. They have commented only briefly on the formation of HRP, and then only when asked. They do not yet take the new party seriously.

Certainly, any new party has two strikes against it before it even meets. Voters are tremendous conservatives; they will rarely listen to, let alone vote for, any party but the one to which they are committed. The biggest problem always is to be heard above the crowd, to be taken seriously—and in Michigan, the HRP is not a third party, it

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is more likely to be one of seven on the ballot in 1972.

On the other hand, it has a few things going for it. Not the least of these is Zolton Ferency's political professionalism; and even the others in the movement can be classed as at least semi-pros. These are not the innocents of 1968's Peace and Freedom or New Politics Parties; they are not "kids" in any sense. HRP contains a nucleus of people who know their way about the political thickets. They have rung doorbells, run for office, managed campaigns. The movement includes some of NDC's best (as well as some of its worst) organizers. And they have a basic understanding of the need for organization above rhetoric.

They also have Ferency's really impressive publicity value. He is what the press considers "good copy," and he knows very well how to make the most of it. No one else in Michigan could get the new party into the media as favorably, or as often; no one could get it more public attention. If nothing else, Zolton is always interesting.

And the party's founders have a relatively clear view of their potential. They do not expect to storm the political battlements and conquer with the power of right on their side. They do not expect to win a decisive political battle for some time to come, nor are they setting any definitive long-range goals. They are prepared to work hard for limited gains, and to wait. They are therefore likely to have more staying power than their short-lived predecessors.

They hope, at least, to counterbalance Huber's pull to the Right. They consider a political realignment as one possibility, and the ultimate acceptance of their positions by the Democratic Party as another. They will work however they can to shift Michigan's politics to the Left.

Finally, they are keeping their options open. In December, at the urging of Ferency, Don Peterson of Wisconsin and some others, the remains of the McCarthy-Kennedy-McGovern national leadership, met in Chicago to discuss 1972. Sixteen states were represented; the agenda included Presidential primaries, the Democratic National Convention, and the McGovern and O'Hara reform commissions, as well as formation of a new party. (They also discussed the possibilities of re-educating Edmund Muskie.) Ferency emphasizes that these are all potential alternatives, and that a final direction must wait on events.

Another, broader-based national meeting is scheduled for February 13-14 in Washington, the call signed by Ferency, Peterson, Theodore Warshafsky of Wisconsin, UCLA philosophy Prof. Arnold Kaufman, national board member of SANE, and national NDC chairman, Marvin Madeson.

Their focus is the Democratic Presidential nomination, but their purpose is to work out an issues- rather than candidate-centered orientation, to avoid being co-opted by any individual candidate. They intend to form a committee to formulate criteria to evaluate candidates; to form a national "citizens' caucus" to influence the selection of Democratic National Convention delegates; most of all, to remain independent.

A new party is at this point merely one available tactic. It seems to be more attractive in Michigan than elsewhere, although there are stirrings, at least, in Wisconsin, New York and a few other states. But they will be fighting upstream, against the whole 150-year current of American politics. □

THE FBI TODAY

1. The Case for Effective Control

H. H. WILSON
Mr. Wilson is in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.

One may assume that even J. Edgar Hoover is mortal and that therefore before very long there will be an opportunity to appoint a new director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This means that, for the first time since 1924, we have an urgent reason for thorough public discussion and debate on the role of the Bureau itself, effective methods of controlling and supervising its operations, and the qualifications to be looked for in a new director.

Secret police agencies pose a real problem for any society and perhaps especially for a democratic society. Atty. Gen. Harlan Fiske Stone said in 1924: "There is always the possibility that a secret police system may become a menace to free government and free institutions." There is always a tendency for such agencies, seeking to prove their usefulness and expand their functions, to create "potential enemies." Robert K. Murray, one of the leading scholars of the 1920s Red scare, concluded that "the United States Department of Justice was, itself, one of the major agents fostering Red scare hysteria in the fall of 1919." When police agencies move into the political areas of censorship, security, subversive ideas and associations the need for political control and review becomes imperative. It is essential in any society that there be a healthy skepticism toward the "expert," and the more narrow and one-track the so-called expert, the more essential is the skepticism. Unfortunately, so long as there are nations, espionage remains a probability and the development of counterespionage techniques is a necessity. The problem is, therefore, to develop police agencies and security procedures that do not jeopardize essential political freedoms, or infringe on such freedoms as little as possible. This requires an adequate review of security measures and police activities by independent and impar-

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tial authority. Responsible political control involves the relationship of the agency to Congress, especially to appropriations committees; the establishment of lines of authority between the police agency and the President, acting through the attorney general; a partisan debate on security measures, and judicial review of laws and procedures.

If these controls are to be implemented, the public must be alert, informed and genuinely concerned. Instead, Mr. Hoover has cultivated over the past forty-six years an uncritical, mindless adulation. The Director and the Bureau have become folk heroes, an atmosphere has been created wherein even to suggest that the Bureau is a legitimate subject for analysis and political discussion is enough to bring charges that one is subversive, un-American and probably godless. To overcome this unhealthy situation and to stimulate public discussion and debate, I offer the following proposals for change.

First, consideration should be given to limiting the director's term of office. One need not be dogmatic about the actual length of the term; the important thing is to establish the principle. A recent *New York Times* editorial suggested four or five years; the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act originally had a clause (which was defeated) providing for a fifteen-year term. One of the sources of Mr. Hoover's power is his unprecedented tenure. In theory the subordinate of the attorney general, Hoover in practice has been virtually free of control by the attorney general, or by Congress. As the *Times* noted, "a bureaucratic autocracy unchecked by Congress and unsupervised by the Executive has no place in a self-governing society."

As for qualifications, the director should be a man with broad training in history, philosophy, politics and law, not merely as an accountant, or a lawyer, and certainly not primarily as a policeman. Public Law 90-351, Title VI, Sec. 1101, provides that "Effective as of the day following the date on which the present incumbent in the office of Director ceases to serve as such, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . ." This, in theory at least, would give an opportunity for public discussion and consideration of appropriate qualifications. Ideally, one might suggest an individual with the qualities one would like to see on the Supreme Court.

The appointment of an individual from outside the Bureau will not win the support of Mr. Hoover. In 1965, Rep. H. Allen Smith, a former agent, introduced a bill requiring that the director must have served in the Bureau for seven years prior to appointment.

It is also essential that direct supervision of the Bureau's activities be restored to the attorney general. The late Robert Kennedy appears to have been the first attorney general in years to visit FBI district offices and to issue an order to agents. The development of civil service status for the agents, to end what now amounts to a highly personal machine, could contribute to the restrictions of autocratic power. This is currently the practice in Treasury, Civil Service and other investigative agencies.

Second, it is important to deal with the security agency as an institution. Former agent William Turner, whose *Hoover's F.B.I.: The Men and the Myth* is one of very few critical examinations by an insider, argues that selecting a new director will not do enough, that the organization itself must be redesigned. To this end he suggests a reversion to the original conception—that the FBI should be an auxiliary force to investigate those areas not specifically assigned to other agencies. It should be strictly limited to federal crimes where there is reason to suspect their commission. Local crimes should not be proliferated into federal offenses, as, for example, in the Mann Act. At the present time the FBI has power to act under some 257 laws and Executive orders. A limitation on the size of the Bureau could follow from a narrowing of its responsibilities.

In opposing the creation of a centralized police service, Turner suggests that the Identification Division should revert to local police, with the fingerprint file run as a separate entity under the International Association of Chiefs of Police, funded by the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Agency. He also favors the creation of a special agency or section of the Justice Department to specialize in civil rights investigations. The evidence provided by Jack Nelson and Jack Bass in *The Orangeburg Massacre* (reviewed in *The Nation* by Joseph C. Goulden, September 28, 1970) documents what civil rights workers have long known, that FBI agents operate as allies of Southern police departments. Further, "strained relations between the FBI and the Justice Department's civil rights division had existed for years and it was no secret that as a general rule most agents considered civil rights enforcements an odious task, especially in cases that involved accusations against local or state police with whom they worked."

Most important is Turner's proposal that security and counterespionage be the responsibility of a separate agency. The United States is the only major power to place both criminal and security responsibilities under one organization. A different type of individual should be recruited for political intelligence or security work. Such men should be more generally and highly educated, more socially and philosophically sophisticated, than the average police officer. They should be able to "distinguish between a guy with a beard and a subversive." The evidence is clear, as Turner notes, that the FBI's "strong ideological bias and lack of sophistication render it eminently unfit for the delicate task of conducting anti-subversion inquiries in a democracy." Mr. Hoover's statements over the years, and his various books (*Masters of Deceit, A Study of Communism, On Communism*), his testimony before Congressional committees illustrate the simple-minded and semi-literate approach to "subversion" or "radicalism" that has characterized the Bureau since the beginning of his forty-six-year reign. As former Atty. Gen. Ramsey Clark said, the FBI's pursuit of the Communist Party was a "terribly wasteful use of very valuable resources."

Third, procedures should be developed to assure a rigorous annual examination of Bureau expenditures, both by the Congressional Appropriations Committee and by the General Accounting Office. At present, the CIA and the FBI are free from examination by the General

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Accounting Office, and the annual FBI budget has passed $200 million. In practice, Congress has never really exerted any control over, or even attempted a serious analysis of, the Bureau's effectiveness.

In addition, it may be desirable to institute a periodic review and evaluation of Bureau operations by an independent body, perhaps a distinguished Presidential commission. Such a body could hold public hearings where citizen complaints could be heard. Subsequent investigation of such testimony could be made part of an independent audit of Bureau effectiveness. It is shocking that serious derelictions of duty by the FBI have been allowed to pass almost unnoticed by the press, and have been ignored entirely by those in authority. Writing of the Orangeburg Massacre, Nelson and Bass say, "almost incredibly, the Justice Department itself did not know that at least three FBI agents witnessed the incident. Nor did it find out until almost three months later. . . . The motive for misleading the Justice Department—in effect lying to the Attorney General . . . was known perhaps only to the FBI." Since then, Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell has announced blandly that he finds nothing improper in Mr. Hoover's attack on Rev. Daniel Berrigan and Rev. Philip Berrigan. The Director's charges, according to the incumbent Attorney General, did not violate a Justice Department rule against comment on current investigation, despite the fact that Hoover made public "raw investigative information." The Bureau has repeatedly violated proscribed modes of electronic eavesdropping. Prof. Alan Westin concludes that these practices go "beyond the subject areas it has admitted to publicly, that the Attorney General does not exercise effective control over FBI wire tapping and bugging operations, and that FBI mores encourage field offices and individual agents to eavesdrop whenever they deem it useful in criminal investigations, down to the level of gambling operations."

False and irrelevant information should be eliminated from the files on private citizens and on those candidates for governmental positions where some security check is justified. There is no excuse for the countless thousands of dossiers on private citizens, which Mr. Hoover started accumulating even before 1924. They should be destroyed. As Ramsey Clark warned: "Much of the information gathered by investigative agencies is unevaluated, uncorroborated, untrue, and unimportant—but its misuse can be devastating." It is typical of the FBI's empire building that it has gained control of Project Search, originated by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as an experiment designed to give the states a computerized source of up-to-date criminal records. [See "Tooling Up for Repression: The Cops Hit the Jackpot," by Joseph C. Goulden, *The Nation*, November 23, 1970.] The Security and Privacy Committee of Project Search recommended that any citizen should be able to see what the computers had recorded about him, but Jerome J. Daunt, of the FBI's information center, rejected the suggestion. It is estimated that the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division maintains at present some 50 million index cards and at least 5 million investigative reports. No matter how excellent the quality of its security personnel, no free society can afford the risk involved in compiling such files on its citizens. Furthermore, an effective security system for sensitive positions has no legitimate need for such proliferation of dossiers. There is always the danger that secret dossiers, cluttered with unverified gossip and irrelevant personal detail, may be used for political and personal blackmail. As a former agent said: "I have always been terrified of what might happen after [Hoover] leaves. There is enough data in those files to make them the damnedest Gestapo outfit this country has ever seen. If those files ever fall into the wrong hands, living in this country will be dangerous as hell. We'll have a goddamned secret police on our hands."

Conrad, Los Angeles Times

"We Finally Got the Goods on Those Berrigan Brothers. Look What They've Been Advocating."

Even under Hoover there has been some demonstration of the potential for abuse of such files in the attack on Dr. Martin Luther King* and the discrediting of ex-Sen. Edward V. Long. And it is well to remember that the FBI is only one of many government agencies and private organizations busily involved in compiling dossiers on private citizens. In November 1969, the Secret Service issued to federal and local law-enforcement agencies a directive which could result in the collection of negative information about millions of Americans. Nominally intended to gather data needed to protect high government officials, the directive is worded so vaguely as to cover information on civil disturbances, attempts to "embarrass" high officials, people seeking "redress of imaginary grievances, etc.," and individuals making "irrational" or "abusive statements" about government officials.

*An article in *The Atlantic* [November 1970], "The Government and Martin Luther King" by Victor S. Navasky, gives a complete record of the spying by Washington on Dr. King.

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In this connection the public and its representatives should insist on a searching scrutiny into the reliability of informants. Mr. Hoover has always placed great and uncritical faith in his informers, doing everything in his power to protect them from adequate cross-examination. One of the more disgraceful practices of the 1950s was the use and protection of a stable of professional witnesses and informers—including some fairly disreputable types—by agencies of the federal government, including the Justice Department. Despite repeated instances of dubious testimony and outright perjury, these individuals were retained on the federal payroll. One assistant attorney general, in responding to nationwide protests against the continued use of such informers, charged that the protests were "Communist-inspired." If Mr. Hoover has ever employed the investigative powers of the FBI to protect government employees and citizens against false accusations it is one of the better kept secrets.

In the case of Elizabeth Bentley, who was one of the more imaginative and creative witnesses, Mr. Hoover provided a blanket endorsement: "All information furnished by Miss Bentley, which was susceptible to check, has proven to be correct. She had been subjected to the most searching of cross-examinations; her testimony has been evaluated by juries and reviewed by the courts and has been found to be accurate." Prof. Herbert Packer, in *Ex-Communist Witnesses: Four Studies in Fact Finding,* comments: "The suggestion that Miss Bentley's story has been reviewed and found accurate by operation of the judicial process is unwarranted."

To achieve effective control of a police organization like the FBI a concerned public must demand change. No libertarian leadership is to be expected from this Administration, nor can the Supreme Court be relied on to protect constitutional freedoms. As Mayor Lindsay said: "We have seen all too clearly that there are men—now in power in this country—who do not respect dissent, who cannot cope with turmoil, and who believe that the people of America are ready to support repression as long as it is done with a quiet voice and a business suit."

It is of tremendous importance that some independent organization take the lead in stimulating a public discussion of the issues at stake. One possible sponsor of such a conference is the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, another the newly formed Committee for Public Justice which includes on its executive council a number of distinguished citizens: Ramsey Clark, Telford Taylor, Jerome Wiesner, Norman Dorsen, Burke Marshall, Lillian Hellman. Participants should include distinguished legal scholars, public officials and others who have demonstrated concern for the preservation of civil liberties. This is no partisan political issue, but one that ought to arouse the most dedicated, tough-minded conservatives as much as convinced liberals or radicals. At stake is the preservation of personal liberty in any present or future conflict with the bureaucratic state. □

2. The Heresy of John F. Shaw: A Purloined Letter

The following letter was written by John F. Shaw, a special agent for the FBI, under circumstances which we detailed in an editorial in last week's issue. It was addressed to Abraham S. Blumberg, a member of the faculty of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, who had taught a class which Mr. Shaw had attended as a volunteer FBI trainee. The letter was not intended for publication or classroom use; in fact it was never mailed to the addressee. Some 8 pages of the original 15 were retrieved from wastebaskets in the Bureau office in which Shaw worked. When Shaw declined to deliver the full text to his superiors, he was immediately placed on probation and later ordered to the office in Butte, Mont. As he explained to his superiors, Shaw could not accept the transfer because his wife—the Shaws have four children—was critically ill (she still is), so he resigned. The resignation was accepted by Mr. Hoover "with prejudice" because of "atrocious judgment" Shaw had shown in not reporting adverse criticism of the Bureau to his supervisors or to the director. For three months now Shaw has been without employment as a law-enforcement officer. Offers of positions in Baltimore and New York were withdrawn when it was learned that his resignation had been accepted "with prejudice."

We have not edited the letter other than to correct a few inadvertent misspellings. A few passages, dealing with matters extraneous to the theme of the FBI and Mr. Hoover, have been deleted; in each instance the deletion has been indicated. The letter is published with the permission of Mr. Blumberg and Mr. Shaw. The editors decided to publish it for these reasons: it is one of the rare instances in which a special agent (Shaw joined the FBI in 1963) has set forth his views of the Bureau, its workings, and of Mr. Hoover's performance as director; it is inherently interesting; and it underscores, better than an editorial comment, the harsh and arbitrary treatment accorded Shaw (we are pleased to learn that the American Civil Liberties Union has filed a suit on his behalf); finally it lends support to the argument and conclusions set forth in the article by H. H. Wilson. Now, while the public can still benefit from Mr. Hoover's testimony, is the time for a thorough public study and discussion of the kind which Mr. Wilson proposes. For our part we would at this time hazard only one conclusion. No mortal, male or female, not even one who possessed the combined virtues of St. Francis, George Washington, Florence Nightingale and Ralph Waldo Emerson, should be permitted to hold and exercise for a lifetime—for all practical purposes without adequate Executive or legislative control or supervision—the awesome powers which Mr. Hoover, by a subtle process of acquisition and prescription as well as direct delegation, has managed to acquire.

—The Editors

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. . . As an FBI agent who has plied his peculiar trade for seven years, I am offering personal observations based on my own experience. I do not pose as an expert in FBI affairs, because the average agent-employee simply is not privy to the formulation of Bureau policy, and has no *precise* conception of how the internal power structure of his organization actually functions. . . .

Basically the Bureau pulse-beat is transmitted coast-to-coast through 55 geographically spaced field offices which operate as partially autonomous cells. A Special Agent in Charge (SAC) is *technically in command* at each of these 55 locations. Actually, an SAC is not generally known for his independence of action or his propensity for original thought. He is probably best recognized as a "sounding-board" for the Director's policies, thoughts, and directions and as a "competent administrator" in the daily routine of his office. Operational control of the FBI is centralized in Washington, D.C. When the Director dictates, 55 scribes take notes and these notes are soon translated into "standard operating procedure." Centralized authority, maintained through high-speed communications between Seat of Government (Headquarters) and the field offices, is the key to the Bureau's operational control, uniformity and efficiency (?).

How centralized is this control? Well, woe to the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in Indianapolis, Butte, Buffalo, or San Francisco if some "independent" remark or prepared press-release is later construed by Headquarters as out-of-line with "established Bureau policy." Washington is always in the enviable position of placing its own interpretation on all communications and information it receives from its field offices. Washington weighs, evaluates and passes judgment on the results of investigation submitted; and effectively assumes the role of "Monday morning quarterback." It is not an uncommon phenomenon that a field investigation which started out well with Washington's full approval, suddenly hits a snag and is judged to have been mishandled or poorly administered in the light of some intervening bad publicity. Thus in the Lee Harvey Oswald case, the Bureau *publicly* refused to accept any blame in the handling of its investigation of Oswald; but *after* the Dallas debacle had generally lost front-page news coverage, the Bureau censured, suspended and transferred the Special Agent to whom the Oswald case had been assigned. The agent's guilt was that he had failed to "properly administer" his case. There simply is no excuse in the organization for bad publicity or any investigative act which results in "embarrassment to the Bureau."

The Bureau, as is perhaps true of any para-military organization, embodies characteristics and relies on methods which simply do not appeal to the mind of the philosopher, the social scientist or the professor. I think a similar rift exists, by way of analogy, between the *practical* and the *theoretical* sciences, perhaps to a lesser degree. Within the FBI "system" there *is* regimentation, which necessarily circumscribes the area of free expression and independent choice of action. The area of allowance within which an agent can legitimately question prescribed policies, methods and goals, is extremely limited for the sake of discipline, control, and uniform procedure. Without question, the lack of some centralized administration would eventually lead to chaos in the field divisions. The simple Bureau response, of course, even to implied opposition to "one-man-centralized" authority is "follow procedures or find a new job."

The fact is that an agent is an *agent*—an instrument for executing what has been transmitted down through the chain-of-command. His job is fairly pragmatic. The rules and regulations are *amply*, if not *clearly*, spelled out, and so are the penalties for violating, ignoring or misconstruing the "letter of the law." Internal discipline in the Bureau is swift and harsh. Unfortunately, too, it is often quite arbitrary. Punishment is usually meted out in direct proportion to the amount of bad publicity generated by the particular mistake or incident.

The difficulty with the Bureau's rigid system of control and discipline, however, is exactly the point you made in class: Personal initiative and aggressive action tend to be blunted *up* and *down* the line. It is an inherent defect in the bureaucratic process (perhaps in human nature, for that matter) "to fulfill the minimum requirements; to take the minimum action necessary" in a given situation; to avoid the pitfalls of the past and follow the proven "safe route." In the Bureau, as anywhere else, the letter of the law can receive much undue emphasis while the spirit of the law is seemingly forgotten. Mediocrity *can* survive quite successfully within the system.

One effect of the Bureau's promoting its image so vociferously through publicity is the acquired characteristic of "over-caution." I believe it is possible for an organization to become so conscious of its public image—its unsullied reputation—that it is actually reduced in its effectiveness. At a time when the entire governmental "establishment" is under assault, the Bureau of course is even more sensitive to criticism from any quarter. I suggest that if avoidance of criticism becomes the *chief* consideration of an agency, there is little likelihood that its members will be distinguishable for their imagination, initiative and aggressive action. There is a haunting phrase that echoes throughout the Bureau. "Do not embarrass the Director." This has been so widely interpreted and liberally applied that there is some question today what action or conduct cannot be considered "embarrassing," "indiscreet," "imprudent" or "ill-timed."

This brings me to the question of *"Public Relations"* which is as integral a part of the FBI as it is of any modern corporation with a product to sell or a service to provide to the public. The Bureau obviously depends on strong public cooperation for success in its investigations. Without public cooperation and receptiveness, the Bureau could not expect to obtain the information it solicits and needs on a day-to-day basis in meeting its responsibilities.

Whether its public relations program is *excessive*—and to what degree—is a question open to some debate. I would argue for continued good publicity, responsive to *current* needs, and based on *current* noteworthy accomplishments. But dispense with the uninspired stream of gangster stories that relate back to the roaring 20's and 30's. Through dogged repetition the Bureau sometimes creates the impression—inadvertently—that it has done nothing particularly worthwhile since Hoover personally disarmed Alvin Karpis in 193(?). Tradition has its place, but in the Bureau, apparently this means dragging out the

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skeletal remains of John Dillinger, "Baby Face" Nelson and "Machine-Gun" Kelly at every law enforcement luncheon, and today when there is justifiable concern over international espionage who is really impressed with the FBI's capture of bumbling Nazi saboteurs landing off a U-boat during World War II?

We are not simply rooted in tradition. We're stuck in it up to our eyeballs. And it all revolves around one key figure; viz., the life and exploits of J. Edgar Hoover. On the other hand, to knock the Bureau for fostering *any* kind of publicity program is to say in effect: "It doesn't pay to advertise." It not only pays, but if the FBI is to continue to operate openly and effectively, a balanced approach to public relations is indispensable.

I think, however, that the Bureau offends the sensitive critic by the way in which it projects its image—with the deft subtlety of a sledge-hammer. But I also take exception to the manner in which criticism is sometimes leveled at us. I think it is one thing to raise a point of difference or to request closer scrutiny of a particular area of operation, but it is another matter altogether to raise the spectre of Nazi Germany in stating a case against the Bureau. The critic who resurrects the Gestapo ghost to cite supposed excesses of the FBI, is, in my opinion, appealing to pure emotionalism and wallowing in the cheapest form of rhetoric. I would have to dismiss such a contrived comparison as inflated oratory à la Joe McCarthy, in the absence of more documentary evidence than has been forthcoming to date. It is regrettable to me that the "big smear" tactics of the McCarthy era find a resurgence today whenever supposedly "intelligence" debate is joined. The FBI is certainly open to criticism and public scrutiny. But, whatever deficiencies the critic may raise, the Bureau's record speaks for itself—and that record does not warrant a slander campaign led by some demagogue equally the match of Hoover (e.g. Robert Kennedy, if you will).

The Bureau is always in the path of criticism because of the sensitive nature of its responsibilities. In recent years, Washington columnists have raised speculation about "dangerous, extraneous information" in the secret files of the FBI accumulated in the course of its investigations, but not strictly germane to those investigations. You, yourself, mentioned "personal dossiers" compiled by the FBI on political figures in Washington, D.C. circles; possibly on every congressman on Capitol Hill. Not to minimize the inherent danger of such files, if they exist, but their compilation presumably on a continuous basis would require a massive amount of manpower that might *just* exceed the manning level of the FBI. I seriously question whether so much information of the "little blackbook" variety is either "on deposit" or is being maintained for the express purpose of political blackmail. In the hands of an unscrupulous person, practically any sensitive information uncovered in the course of an FBI investigation *might* serve some sinister purpose. But such has simply not been the proven case in the Bureau's history. Periodic wild speculation in this area has not built a conclusive case against the FBI, nor raised the imputation of wrongdoing in our regard *convincingly*.

Whatever faults may be attributed to Hoover, whatever criticism can be attached to his tenure as Director, however much displeasure (hate) his longevity may arouse it is still quite a task to impugn his character and integrity on defensible grounds. Personal idiosyncracies, perhaps. But character defects, hardly. Hoover's reputation has been exposed to, and has survived well, under the poisoned pens of the sharpest critics on the D.C. circuit never particularly known for their quality of mercy.

This brings us to the Hoover-King confrontation of past fame and the still unconfirmed stories that the Washington press corps has speculated into fact and fanned into national controversy. What is evident in the stories alleging that Hoover "blackmailed" King into silence, under threat of an exposé of personal misconduct, is that *somebody somewhere* has *lied*. But there are as many possibilities here as there are actors in the cast. Why pin the rap on Hoover? It is interesting to note that Mrs. Coretta King *insists* that the news stories have no substance in fact; that whatever differences existed between Hoover and Dr. King, the matter did not involve "political blackmail" on the grounds of immorality.

Suppose in this instance Hoover *did* confront King with evidence of personal indiscretions, gathered in the course of an FBI investigation of Dr. King's activities (as alleged by the press). I am then left with a sick feeling on two counts that I find *equally* disturbing: (1) that Hoover would elect a dangerous expediency and use information in official files to silence Dr. King's criticism of the FBI and (2) that King, who was proclaimed as a great religious and moral leader in his own right, was in fact so vulnerable to compromise. If the implications of the Hoover-King episode are founded in fact, is it not consistent in rendering fair judgment (strict justice) to attach equal weight to the hyprocrisy of King as to the ruthlessness of Hoover? If it comes down to a question of personal integrity, whose integrity should be attacked to exonerate the other's? It seems patently unfair to me in this issue to crucify (figuratively) Hoover for gross defects of character in the misuse of public office, on the one hand; and to canonize (figuratively) Dr. King despite a few reported "peccadillos" in the discharge of his ministry, on the other. It is just possible that truly objective criticism could destroy either man with equal effectiveness. But Hoover has his work cut out for him now in any continuation of the Hoover-King controversy, because his adversary from this point on will be a recognized, national hero who died as a martyr for his particular cause. These are tough odds even for a seasoned bureaucrat like Hoover.

In judging the merits of the FBI, I foresee a problem if the examiner refuses to distinguish between *Hoover* and the *agency*. (Although, I admit, Hoover probably doesn't recognize the distinction himself.) Yes, a "personality cult" does extend through the echelons of management in the FBI. But I do not think the cultists infect every area of Bureau operations. The field operations generally proceed without undue concern for the personal edification of the Director. Of course, in the handling of personal promotions up the ladder into the Bureau hierarchy, the cult of personality does play an important role. It is certainly no "military secret," though I am sure, not widely published either, that adulation of the Director in some form or other provides the main catalyst in the process of

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"administrative advancement." There are some pretty funny success stories in the annals of the Bureau, but I will ignore them today due to the limitations of time and space.

But how does one merit promotional consideration within a paramilitary system professedly based on merit? Well, there are lots of ways. Requesting a "personal interview" with Mr. Hoover, however, is probably the most frequently used avenue to advancement. Within the allotted few minutes of time, apparently countless Bureau executives today were able to impress "the man" with their latent leadership capabilities. Other stories circulate, too, that some aspirants have unfortunately been identified as truck-drivers in the course of their interviews, and cast out forever into the outer darkness.

I cannot draw on personal experience in this area, but from "reliable sources" I am led to believe that the personal interview with Mr. Hoover runs as follows: (1) preliminary greeting and hand-shake (2) the agent expressing his desire for promotional consideration (previously cleared in writing for an appointment) (3) a brief "sounding out" and shop-talk about current cases of national interest (4) posing for the official full-profile, colored photograph and (5) farewell hand-shake. Within this brief period (reportedly timed by stop-watch buffs between 3 to 5 minutes) the Director passes on the merits of the candidate and jots his cryptic analysis on a memo attached to the government personnel file. There are no statistics available on how many of the current Bureau hierarchy were catapulted onto the promotional ladder by the formula described above. Speculation is that a considerable number were. Of course once afforded the initial opportunity, the candidate must technically "swim or sink" (for himself)—but I suggest that the talents required for this aquatic exercise may be dangerously *minimal.*

In today's 20th Century world of management techniques, and especially within an organization attaching great weight, publicly, to merit and ability, I believe that there may be a more sure and efficient way of recognizing latent leadership assets, than during the first impressions of a 3 to 5 minute interview. I would even argue that a mental incompetent (provided only he wore a dark suit and were otherwise well-groomed) could play an impressive role for so brief a span. Even granting that Mr. Hoover possesses extraordinary powers of intuition and judgment, I nevertheless doubt that he could safely pass on good horseflesh after only a 5 minute examination of the brute.

The above "formula for promotion" is probably not all-inclusive nor are my remarks meant to stigmatize all who advance within the system. But I have seen the formula applied in some instances and I tend now to be persuaded that too many "qualified leaders" are selected for advancement on a modicum of merit and ability. Other factors take precedence. And it is too easy a temptation to rely on the tested formula of fawning flattery and thereby select the course of least resistance to "the top."

A cynical observation by a disappointed office seeker? Perhaps. But I had decided several years ago that advancement by the route described offered little in the way of actual rewards or job satisfaction, and could never compensate for the real damage inflicted on the family. Simply stated, the more promotions in the Bureau, the more physical relocations. Transfers at inopportune times have a way of disrupting the entire family circle. . . .

At this point it seems logical to ask how the FBI actually developed into the organization it is today. In due respect to Hoover it is accurate to state that the record of the Bureau prior to 1924 was not an enviable one. Internal corruption was a matter of national disgrace. Hoover was instrumental in establishing, then in gradually expanding, the role of a select, disciplined and comparatively well-trained body of investigators. Gradually, the Bureau's responsibilities have been expanded to the breadth and scope we recognize today. Part of the current "problems" of the FBI—and I cannot see where the fault in this area attaches to Hoover—owes to the enlarged area of its jurisdiction, from once solving bank robberies and interstate thefts to now catching spies and protecting the Smokey Bear emblem! (Now who in hell decided the FBI should protect Ol' Smokey?)

Regardless of critical acclaim to the contrary, the FBI numbers only about 7,000 Special Agents. At the same time, the Bureau is charged with the investigation of approximately 180 separate violations of federal law (only one of which, for instance, concerns violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1954). Overall the record will show that the Bureau has kept fairly well abreast of its responsibilities, amid the growing complexity of the laws. The criticism, if any is warranted, is not in the direction of "overaggressiveness," in my opinion, but "conservatism" in the Bureau's approach to its responsibilities. The Bureau tends to seek new "successes" only in areas where it has met similar successes in the past, by the same tried formulas. Patterns develop. Consequently agent manpower continues to be focused on stolen car cases, on "petty" thefts, and on bank robberies (etc.), because these types of crime have produced high statistical success in the past. Sameness sets in. Read the Appropriations for 1971, and it will seem like a carbon copy of Appropriations for 1970. Only the names have been changed to protect the guilty.

Only recently has the Bureau begun to develop an intelligence network for a coordinated attack on organized crime. Bank robberies and "top-ten fugitives" have always taken precedence, perhaps because they generated headlines in the nation's press. But now the pendulum has swung. Bank robbers are a dime-a-dozen, because there are so many banks waiting to be robbed. Bank robbers are now "small apples" compared to the annual rake-in of organized crime. For decades, the Bureau refused to believe or chose to ignore the fact that the criminal underworld had not only invaded the world of legitimate business but was operating with the efficiency and expertise of "big business." The Bureau was slow to cooperate in the organization of coordinated Federal Strike Forces, which are at least a novel approach to an old stalemated problem. The Bureau generally refuses to recognize "sophisticated methods" of combatting crime which are outside its own arsenal. At the same time, the internal power structure of the FBI has been too rigidly set in its own ways to conceive or implement a novel program of action involving *cooperation with outside*

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agencies. Professional jealousy is not an uncommon FBI shortcoming.

At this point, I submit the enclosed copy of "FBI 1971 Appropriation" as fairly well representative of the Bureau's current worth and effectiveness, in outlining its areas of concentration. The reader may not agree with the ways in which the FBI is expending its budget but, objectively, the reader should at least concede that Bureau expenditures are pretty clearly spelled out. Supporting statistics appear in profusion. Now whether the FBI should re-orient its emphases in particular areas, whether entire areas of criminal activity should be re-evaluated, whether some existing federal statutes should be discarded altogether—these are all debatable issues. The Bureau at least sets forth the entire spectrum of its operations in a logical, straightforward manner, for whatever comments and/or criticism the Congressional Appropriation Sub-Committee wishes to make. The budget is thus *technically* subjected to close scrutiny. But as you can see by reviewing the issue enclosed, the current FBI budget was accepted by the sub-committee without any criticism and with only superficial inquiry.

This brings us once again to the person of Mr. Hoover. It is practically impossible to divorce him from any academic discussion of the Bureau, particularly Bureau administration. It is here that arguments both *pro* and *con* the FBI tend to lose their objectivity. I believe that many critics just don't possess enough material facts about Bureau policies to critique them effectively or argue intelligently; and thus resort to invective or vilification. I likewise admit that the Bureau employee is not the best person to act as Defender of the Faith in most instances. The facts he possesses are simply too limited and too one-sided to afford him a balanced view of the world "outside" the Bureau. Clichés abound in arguments *for* and *against* the FBI and inevitably "open" discussion leads to an exchange of snide remarks, with neither side bolstering its argument with many facts or much logic. . . .

Acknowledging a certain degree of ignorance right from the start, I argue that the Bureau is an effective law enforcement agency in spite of the fact that one man has been at the helm for more than 40 years. Unquestionably, Hoover's grip on the FBI remains vise-like (some say "stranglehold") and the net effect is without a doubt frustrating needed changes and inhibiting the range and thrust of current operations. With the Director's position perennially secure, the infusion of new life and new direction is a moot point. Whether justified or not, the Director also seems to have the House Sub-Committee on Appropriation in his hip pocket, and this body technically controls the fiscal life-line of the FBI. How else can one explain the *pitifully* weak line of questioning carried on by the committee year after year at appropriation time? Either this committee has hopelessly blind faith and confidence in Hoover's direction of the Bureau or else, due to fumbling incompetence, this committee cannot even identify a problem when it sees one. Their familiar acquiescence persists year after year, in Hoover's favor.

In either case, I do not believe that the 100 or more pages of testimony serve the purpose for which they were originally intended; viz., to oversee Bureau operations and expenditures and to evaluate their net worth. But this annual *cake-walk* before Congress does not reflect so poorly on the FBI as it does on the competency (and moral stamina) of governmental administration. It is not the duty of the Bureau, after all, to *demand* closer scrutiny or more aggressive, open-minded inquiry into its operations. I suggest that the esteemed committee is screwed up in failing to exercise its own legislative prerogatives for "other considerations." A cursory reading of the Director's testimony suggests a carefully rehearsed game of charades, with Mr. Hoover surfacing as the dominant character and the various congressmen as supporting players in rather perfunctory roles.

I cannot accept the argument, however, that the Director is never openly opposed on any issue (1) because of his awesome bureaucratic power and (2) because of potentially ruinous evidence in the files of the FBI. The implication here is that the entire Congress of the United States is intimidated on the basis of compromising facts in the hands of Hoover. You, yourself, mentioned that critics of the Bureau among Congress would "axe" the Director in a minute, if their hands were not tied. Tied by whom? In what way? We are apparently back to the argument for the existence of secret dossiers on persons in high places. Great Scott! Is it really possible that the *whole* Congress of the United States is barred from criticizing the Bureau because of skeletons hidden in Congressional closets? That *many* skeletons? Isn't there at least one Lancelot among them who is not susceptible to blackmail or who is not a John Bircher? Such a sweeping statement implies (1) that our body of elected officials consume an inordinate amount of time concealing skeletons, thus dabbling in immorality and the black-arts and (2) that they pursue these pastimes so notoriously or carelessly that Bureau agents *on all sides* collect the data and compile "campy" dossiers, for later use. Assuming that each new increment of congressmen is as corruptible as its predecessor, the Bureau must then concentrate significant agent manpower on a regular basis to amass current evidence for its files. This would hardly leave the Bureau enough manpower to carry out its normally authorized duties elsewhere. In these days of sensational journalism, one wonders why the first irate *retired* congressman hasn't come forward yet to publish his account of "How I was blackmailed into silence by the FBI."

In the course of your summer lectures, Professor, you also made passing mention of the fact that certain professional colleagues had been ruined by the FBI, and deprived of their academic livelihood. Out of context and without documentation that statement is tantamount to Joe McCarthy saying in his inimitable fashion "I have here a list of names of *Communists* in high places." What Professors? Under what circumstances? The subjects of prosecutive cases?

I have periodic official contact with eminent members of the academic community at various levels, including the university, and am specifically aware of Bureau procedure in handling such contacts. If anything, the Bureau treats these contacts with extreme delicacy. The basis for this delicacy, of course, is the Bureau's conscious avoidance of infringing on the area of academic freedom surrounding members of the teaching profession. This is not to say, however, that such persons must lie totally outside

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the legitimate responsibility of the federal government in matters of investigation.

I suggest that if the FBI had half the power of suppression credited in your (sweeping) allegation, "campus unrest" could have been snuffed out years ago coast-to-coast at the personal whim of the Director. It would thus have been a simple operation for the Bureau to have identified faculty and student dissidents nationwide and to have "eliminated" them from the scenes of campus disorder.

I *have* encountered Professors who were seriously concerned about the basis of a particular Bureau investigation or inquiry, but I have encountered none who indicated, either at the time or subsequently, that he felt intimidated or threatened by our presence.

I submit that the FBI has never *countenanced*, under any circumstances, either tacitly or explicitly, the persecution, harassment or ruination of an academician even though he might have been the legitimate subject of some official investigation. If an agent was in fact *known* to have acted in this direction, contrary to Bureau guidelines, I am positive that his actions did not escape censure and that he was "hanged" in the outcome. It is *possible,* however, that in the Bureau's own traditional way of "rectifying" a situation, the execution may *not* have been publicly acknowledged. But it is difficult to deal in generalities. . . .

I feel certain that all of what I have said will be construed by you fairly and, for my obvious further benefit, retained by you in complete confidence. Otherwise, I shall be obliged to begin preparing my defense before some governmental court of inquisition weighing the merits of my remarks. In the Bureau's eyes of course, however academically intended, my statements would constitute a prima facie case of *heresy*. I would prefer not to be martyred this calendar year. . . . □

NOTES ON THE NEW CONSERVATISM

The Deradicalized Intellectuals

EUGENE GOODHEART
Mr. Goodheart is on leave from M.I.T. He is writing a book on culture and politics on a Guggenheim fellowship.

The movement of the political pendulum doesn't characterize the general population, whose conservative instincts have been fairly reliable, but rather the volatile "intelligentsia" which seems to thrive on changes of opinion and mood. Thus, since we have begun to mark our "progress" by decades, it was inevitable that after the radical sixties a conservative reaction would begin to emerge in the seventies. One of the visible signs of this reaction is the current editorial policy of *Commentary*. As Nathan Glazer remarks in a recent article on his deradicalization, *Commentary* in the early fifties had given some impetus to the formation of a new radical conscience in America by, for instance, bringing the work of Paul Goodman into prominence. Now apparently viewing the work of this conscience during the past several years, *Commentary* has decided it has had enough and is openly espousing the "conservative" cause. Thus Norman Podhoretz remarks editorially, apropos of Glazer's article:

> In 1970 some of us who came a decade earlier to radicalism via the route of ideas rather than the route of personal grievance are convinced that it has become more important to insist once again on the freedom of large areas of human experience from the power of politics, whether benevolent or malign, than to acquiesce in the surly tyranny of the activist temper in its presently dominant form. It is in this sense that we consider ourselves deradicalized, and not out of any sudden lapse into indifference over the remediable ills which afflict the world and to whose removal the spirit of radical activism has come to stand, for all practical purposes, in a stubborn and perverse and most intractable opposition.

The work of the radical conscience during the sixties is vulnerable to criticism, even radical criticism, but Podhoretz's polemical posture (and those of recent contributors to *Commentary*) suggests an insensitivity (despite the disclaimer that there has been no sudden lapse into indifference) to the fundamental fact that we are suffering a moral and political crisis of considerable magnitude and that this crisis has not been brought about merely by radical willfulness. "Personal grievance" hardly covers the profound feeling against the war in Vietnam or the fight for social justice at home, unless by *personal* Podhoretz means that people have felt personally menaced by American policies; for instance, the threat of the draft, as well as the feeling of the moral indignity of the war itself. If Podhoretz's earlier radicalism was merely intellectual (he of course intends to suggest its superiority, because presumably it was disinterested and reflective), it could not have been a very substantial or *experienced* radicalism. Podhoretz suggests that whatever their limitations, he would much prefer to return to the sophistications of the fifties after the wild sixties.

At the same time, Podhoretz obviously feels uneasy about the word "conservative." In an article on him in *The Wall Street Journal,* he is reported to disclaim any connection between his line and the politics of Richard Nixon. "The truth is he's 'a democratic socialist or a social democrat.' " The use of the word "conservative," he says, is part of a strategy against the fashionable radicalism of his fellow intellectuals. He grants that he had another option which was to reserve the virtuous term "radical" for himself and to denounce "pseudo radicals." But that he didn't choose this course is significant, not only for Podhoretz but for many intellectuals and other people who have wanted to react against radical excesses but were worried about what they were reacting in behalf of.

Podhoretz is not simply responding to the excesses;

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he seems to be responding to the radical idea itself. He is *not* in the position in which Alexander Herzen found himself in the 19th century when he too recoiled from radical excesses.

> Everyone now plays with his cards on the table, and the game itself has become greatly simplified, it is impossible to make mistakes: in every corner of Europe there is the same struggle, the same two camps. You feel quite clearly which you are against, but do you feel your tie with the other camp as clearly as your hatred and disgust for that of the enemy?

The result of this new conservatism (there is nothing intrinsically dishonorable in the conservative idea) is I think to divert attention from the real evils to which radical consciousness has addressed itself.

The hysterical side of the radical argument has been clear enough. For instance, a Luddite dismantling of technology is not only impossible, it is undesirable. I heard a proponent of the counter culture argue to American students in Paris the joys of the primitive life on the very day that hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis were facing the natural elements unencumbered by repressive Western technology. But does the romantic illusion about the joys of a world without technology justify the opposite illusion that the solutions to our problems are contained within the natural progress of technology? Despite the tone of "realism" of Glazer's essay, his response to the radical critique of our cancerous economy is astonishingly complacent:

> The radicals answer that much of the remaining 90 per cent [of the Gross National Product, which according to Glazer is nonmilitary] is also life-denying, going to such unnecessary or harmful products as cars, roads, and television sets. But the vast majority of the population sees in these things the essence of the good life. Human wants can be met in many ways, but they cannot be met by dismantling the machinery, physical and institutional, of modern society. Only a drastic reduction in standards of living—and radicals are the first to insist that standards are already too low for large numbers of our people—or a drastic reduction in the total number of people is compatible with the degree of freedom from organization, control, discipline, and responsibility for the support of others that seems to be the special demand of contemporary radicals.

Glazer simply asserts the by now traditional American desire for the proliferation of commodities without showing any awareness of the costs in physical and moral health. Not a word about what the new conservatism intends to do about the auto industry or industrial pollution. Not a word about the *enlightened* conservatism of Paul Ehrlich, who sees in the traditional capitalist (and Marxist) psychology of abundance a threat to planetary survival, given the increasing discrepancy between the development of the means of subsistence and population growth. Glazer avoids entirely the question of the military-industrial complex with a sociological sleight of hand in the worst tradition of sociology: to say that the military budget is only 10 per cent of the GNP gives no indication of its enormous significance in the economic life of the nation. It is a permanent gain of the sixties that we now perceive the ambiguous moral force of technology and that whether it saves or destroys depends in part on moral and intellectual energies that are other than technological. Whether or not this was known earlier is irrelevant; radical consciousness in America made it a familiar fact.

One of the vices of the current radicalism is the indiscrimination of its attack and the resentful manner in which it is often launched. Examples abound. In a recent *Ramparts* article on the population explosion, Steve Weissman begins with this gratuitous sneer:

> Paul Ehrlich is a nice man. He doesn't hate blacks, advocate genocide or defend the empire. He simply believes that the world has too many people and he's ready at the drop of a diaper pin to say so. He's written his message in *The Population Bomb*, lectured it in universities and churches, and twice used America's own form of birth control, the late-night Johnny Carson Show, to regale bleary-eyed moms and dads with tales of a standing-room-only world, a time of famines, plague and pestilence.

Ehrlich's study is a serious and sophisticated reconstruction of Malthus' argument on the menace of overpopulation. *Ramparts* in fact had published Ehrlich in an earlier issue. Weissman's manner is simply fashionable. So strong is the resentment toward the adversary position that one feels free to impugn motives or at least imply the moral insensitivity of the advocate of the position. The shortcoming of this manner is its failure to distinguish between a rank injustice, like the continuing war in Indochina, and a genuine problem like the population explosion. Another instance: the first issue of *Amistad*, a magazine devoted to black history and culture, promises that it will "tell it like it is." The editors assert that they "know that the truth of Western Civilization lies in precisely what has been omitted from its teaching." There is to be sure no teaching that does not omit or distort the truth. But we know that some truth has been taught. And we know that if truth has been omitted, it often requires strenuous work to discover and reveal it. Unless truth is simply the revelation of the undeniable sufferings of the oppressed—and even this has been taught. (I omit the more egregious instances from the underground press.)

But such failures hardly discredit the unremitting criticism of the American role in Vietnam or of the racist character of our society. And it is scarcely a contribution to the health of American political life simply to rehearse, as Podhoretz does without criticism, the myth propagated by members of both parties that the war in Indochina is winding down and that it is no longer an issue in American politics. Even if the war is winding down for *American soldiers on the field of battle,* it remains a grim reality for the Laotians and the Cambodians as well as the Vietnamese who continue and will continue to be bombed from the air.

As much as indiscriminate action, the inflated statement has been part of the "normal" political discourse of recent years. But it has not happened of itself; the inflated statement contains within itself the infection of American reality. The slaughter of innocents abroad; the continued talk about the disgrace of losing the war; the President flexing the muscles of the American giant, believing that he is performing a moral gesture; his nervous desire for understanding, as if villainy too deserved compassion; the chaos

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of urban life—it has been difficult to contemplate gross reality without feeling the impulse to jeer or rave or cry. That it is impossible to base a politics on jeering, raving or crying should be clear from the current mood of exhaustion on the campus. That it may be morally undesirable as a basis for politics is also evident from witnessing how the habit of outcry can foster unjust intolerance for differences of opinion and outlook.

But then it is not clear at all to anyone at this moment what constitutes an adequate politics. It is certainly a bad sign for the cause of reason in political life that it can so easily be coopted by a man like Spiro Agnew, who has no difficulty urging reason and patience. When Goneril urges Lear to be patient, the fact that patience is a virtue is irrelevant.

There is doubtless no single motive for the present crisis—though what with Vietnam and the urban predicament we have two formidable provocations. But since the crisis is as much subjective as objective, it is necessary to account for the evolution of our feeling that we are in crisis.

What has happened is that we have lost confidence in our understanding of the political life. The fifties fostered confidence that with the "end of ideology" we had achieved not only wisdom but mastery of political, social and economic life. Despite all the foreboding about the inevitable doom of capitalism, America, in the dominant view, had miraculously discovered a way of avoiding doom and of leading the nations of the world to a glorious new future.

These feelings, enforced by increasing disenchantment of Left intellectuals with Soviet socialism, virtually extinguished radical sentiment in America. The sudden visibility of poverty in America (dramatized by unconverted figures of the Left, Michael Harrington and Dwight Macdonald), the increasing unwillingness of the blacks to be regarded simply as an unfortunate exception to the generally benevolent American dispensation, and Vietnam with its imperialist implications and its revelation of the incredible destructiveness of modern technological warfare began to undermine confidence that we had mastered political reality.

But except for the young and some exceptional adults, this loss of confidence did not provide the incentive for people to return to the Left positions that had been abandoned in the thirties and forties. The young could afford a commitment to the Left, because they had not suffered the experience or the sins of Stalinism. They could undertake a leftist politics in good faith, though this good faith was no assurance that they themselves would avoid, in Paul Goodman's words, "the power plays, factionalism, random abuse and tactical lies that aborted the movement in the thirties and the forties." Moreover, since their radicalism was deliberately ahistorical (because of the feeling that to forget the past was somehow to be free of it), it rarely achieved any theoretical interest. It consisted of actions (some of them admirable—like draft resistance and the refusal to pay taxes; many of them of undefined political purpose) and shallow rhetoric. The genuine insights into the technocratic nature of American political economy and its expansive nature became occasions for moral denunciation but it produced no *immanent* critique that would provide the knowledge for significantly changing American society.

Noonan

Filled with moral feeling that things were seriously wrong, no longer confident in benevolent technology, unprepared to resume the traditional Marxist perspective, adults of liberal and radical disposition became vulnerable to every assault, justified and unjustified, upon their consciences. But since the moral anxiety increased without commensurate outlets in coherent and effective political action, the indignation of the radical young tended to become hysterical. Consciences were touched, in many cases deeply touched, but nothing seemed to happen. The understanding of political reality in America grew more confused.

The confusion is not about the fact of the horror of Vietnam or of racism or of poverty. It is about the sources and the remedy. If Vietnam is the result of the failure of the system, then only radical change will make "no more Vietnams" possible. And to make that change, confrontation politics alone is hardly adequate. We need to know what institutions must be changed, the manner in which they are to be changed, and the means by which the change is to be effected. Who will take power and how will radical reform protect itself against self-betrayal, which has almost become a law of historical development. (Existing Socialist systems are dubious models.)

Of course, no theory can substitute for the historical

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process itself, but theory is at least a necessary condition for the revolutionary or reformist action that will do more than simply shake up the system. However, such questions were rarely raised and confronted; instead there developed a habit of open-ended activism (most brilliantly argued for by Daniel Cohn-Bendit; the phenomenon was not confined to America) which was based largely on the assumption that history itself would raise the questions and provide the answers. One unfortunate consequence was the tendency toward indiscriminate attack on all institutions. The critics forgot not only that institutions were absolutely necessary to social life, indeed to the *freedom* of social life, but that some institutions served as protections against the noxious working of other institutions (the university against the military-industrial complex, the courts against racism).

It should be said at once that the New Left in its principal groupings (SDS, Progressive Labor, etc.) has not been alone in theoretical inadequacy. Liberals who themselves felt the need for radical change (e.g., Galbraith) were often astute in their analysis of what was wrong, but had no real sense of what had to be done or what could be done. Electoral politics was felt to be no alternative to confrontation politics, because given the strong propensity in the system for Vietnam involvement and the enormous pressures to sustain it, it was not at all clear that even in the best of circumstances—a victory for Robert Kennedy or Eugene McCarthy, for instance—the system could decide deliberately to extricate itself from Vietnam on terms of acknowledged defeat.

The point to be made about this crisis is not that the political will has its limits, but that the political failures of the system have been a principal cause for the excessively large place that politics has come to occupy in our lives. It is true that there have been many instances of impossible demands and Faustian political fantasies. There *are* limits to what politics can accomplish. But to turn this truth into an occasion for avoiding the political failure of America to stop its criminal war in Vietnam by taking the long view of the killing, as Podhoretz does now (in the long run we'll all be dead) is inexcusable. Certainly those who have demonstrated against the war have felt the resistance of the government to any significant change of position to be something like the force of nature, obstinate and insurmountable. But the language of tragedy applies to our involvement in Vietnam only in its effect on the Vietnamese and the American dead and wounded. The appropriate language for our role in Indochina is moral and political and it concerns the corruption of our system and its agents.

Nothing in the radical performance of the sixties has discredited certain of its insights into American interventionism, technocracy and racism. The effect of the new conservatism—with its sweeping attack on all fronts—is to distort the perspective. (See Walter Goodman on the question of repression, Irving Kristol on the urban crisis, Tom Milstein on the Panthers, Midge Decter on Women's Liberation—with more to come.) Podhoretz has expressed confidence that he is going to win. If he does it will be a Pyrrhic victory—for all of us. □

CHILE: A GOOD NEIGHBOR

RICHARD O'MARA
Mr. O'Mara, who formerly reported from Latin America, is an editorial writer on the Baltimore Evening Sun.

The President of Chile enjoys a unique power: in the event that the Chilean congress rejects any of his constitutional or legislative proposals, he has the authority to take the issue to plebiscite. Former President Eduardo Frei, who during his six years in office suffered some jarring collisions with congress (it once denied him permission to visit the United States), managed to have this provision written into law near the end of his term. He never used it. Today it is at the disposal of Salvador Allende, Chile's new Marxist President and the object these days of Washington's concern in Latin America.

Dr. Allende has sent to congress a constitutional amendment which would lay the legal groundwork for the takeover by the state of the copper industry in Chile. That he has chosen this way to fulfill his principal campaign promise indicates the man's commitment to constitutional form. If he wanted to, Allende could seize the copper companies by decree, but he is intent on getting congressional support for this and other similar ventures. Of course, if congress rejects his constitutional amendment, he can take it to the people by way of Frei's plebiscite. One way or another, Allende seems eager to demonstrate that he is not imposing anything unwanted upon the Chilean people. The complete nationalization of copper, indeed, the socializing of Chile, if he has his way, will be a cooperative procedure.

Salvador Allende came to power promising to return the basic elements of Chile's economy to the state and to regain control of the country's financial machinery. He said he would nationalize all copper, iron and nitrate companies—virtually all the extractive industries—as well as major steel and paper companies. Foreign investors would be bought out. And he proposed to continue, even accelerate, the land-reform program started by President Frei and the Christian Democrats. He has been in office about three months now and shows no sign of reneging on any of his promises. Late in December, he sent to congress a bill authorizing the seizure of all private banking operations, domestic and foreign. At about the same time he announced plans to rationalize the automobile industry by closing the eleven independent plants operating inefficiently in Chile. [See "Mexican Auto Swindle" by Leo Fenster, *The Nation,* June 2, 1969.] He then called for bids on three separate joint government-private corporations to produce automobiles, the government to control the majority of stock in each corporation.

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American capital has generally shied away from joint ventures with foreign governments; that was why the Frei nationalization program was so stoutly resisted by the American copper companies. But joint ventures seem to be the trend, at least along the west coast of South America and in Mexico, and rather than pull out altogether, the foreign investors will probably adjust. In Chile, so far, only domestic companies have been bought out or expropriated. They include the Pacific Steel Company and the Lota-Schwager coal mine, both in Concepción.

The Allende government is making progress with land reform, but is also running into difficulty. The Frei agrarian reform program, begun in 1964, envisaged the settling of 100,000 peasants on their own land by 1970. The Christian Democrats fell far short of that goal: when Frei left office only about 10,000 peasants had their land. This was, in fact, a considerable step forward, considering the reactionary nature of Chilean landlords, but it left thousands of landless people bitterly disappointed.

Jacques Chonchol, who is in charge of President Allende's land-reform program, also worked for the Frei government, and before that for Cuba's Agrarian Reform Institute. During the Frei years he was instrumental in unionizing thousands of farm workers. The Christian Democrats also managed to pass a law requiring landlords and farm corporations to adhere to the rules of collective bargaining. In a sense, Chonchol's problem now is of his own making—he is trying to keep pace with the demands of an organized and increasingly militant peasantry.

An inhibitor to more rapid agrarian reform is the growing fear that a vast and sudden redistribution of land would reduce food production. Chile already imports considerably more than $100 million worth of food a year. So far, Allende has expropriated 1.3 million acres of land, much of it not prime for farming—in southern Chile and Tierra del Fuego. The Frei government, during six years in office, expropriated 8.5 million acres.

The international course for Chile charted by Salvador Allende before his election was as explicitly stated as his domestic program. He promised to recognize the Cuban Government, and he has done so. He has re-established diplomatic relations with Peking, and plans ties with other Communist countries, including North Vietnam, North Korea and the countries of Eastern Europe.

But Allende does not intend to withdraw from the Organization of American States, nor from other multinational and regional organizations to which Chile now belongs. In fact, there are indications that Chile may involve itself even more deeply in the affairs of the Andean economic group, a bloc within the Latin American Free Trade Association comprised of Peru, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador.

Chile's economic nationalism is only one small step ahead of these countries. The Peruvian seizure of the International Petroleum Company in October 1968 was but the most dramatic expression of the mood that prevails in these countries. Its most recent expression was heard just last December when all the members of the Andean group met in Lima and formulated a common policy toward foreign investment. Specifically, they decided to require all foreign companies in these countries to reduce their holdings, within fifteen years, to no more than 49 per cent. Also, they limited the amount of profit foreign investors could remove from individual countries, and prohibited foreign investment in such basic industries as utilities, communications and banks. What Chile is doing, then, is not much different from what its northern neighbors are up to.

It is evident that the Chilean Government has little desire to rile the United States: in fact, Dr. Allende seems to be doing everything possible to avoid a confrontation with Washington. It may not be unavoidable forever, but if a showdown comes it will probably not be unrelated to whatever Chile does to the copper companies.

The Nixon Administration demonstrated a degree of wisdom in not moving harshly against the Peruvian Government on behalf of the International Petroleum Company. That was wise because it indicated that the Administration does not intend to confuse the broad national interests of the United States with those of American capital in Latin America.

Any overt conflict between Santiago and Washington is more likely to arise in the OAS and on the question of Cuba. The Allende regime is more or less committed to speak out in the OAS against the continued isolation of Cuba and to defend its own policy. Nixon, for his part, is committed to maintaining the blockade and ostracism of Cuba. Since Nixon construes this as being in the nation's interest, he is likely to apply pressure in many of the Latin capitals to keep that policy intact.

Whether Peru or Bolivia or both follow Chile's example toward Cuba is uncertain. Peru has an incentive to do so: it is grateful to the Castro government for sending medical personnel to help after the devastating earthquake last May. Bolivia, on the other hand, has a reason not to renew its ties with the government that helped finance and equip Che Guevara's adventure in Bolivia in 1967. But lingering resentment against the Cuban intervention at that time may not be the only factor determining any decision that Gen. Juan Torres makes toward Cuba. Much of the General's support comes from left-wing worker and student organizations, and these have been pushing him to take a tougher stand against American business and to renew contact with Havana.

Overall, Chile appears to be striving for an independent international position similar to that of Mexico. Mexico recognizes Cuba, receives prisoners from Brazil who are ransomed for kidnapped diplomats, and retains control over foreign companies who do business within its borders. Mexico, a conservative, *status quo* country, does not export revolution and has no ideology to propagate.

Similarly, Allende's government is not internationally oriented. Chile agreed to receive the prisoners exchanged in Brazil for the Swiss Ambassador—but only, Allende pointed out, in accordance with its standing obligation to provide sanctuary to political refugees, and not from any similarity of ideology between the President of Chile and the Brazilian prisoners. Salvador Allende appears to be a cautious, though determined man. What's more, he is intent on effecting social and economic changes within Chile, and just as intent on creating as few waves internationally as possible. □

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Security: Highways and Byways

THE ANTI-COMMUNIST IMPULSE. *By Michael Parenti. Random House. 333 pp. $7.95.*

THE ORDEAL OF OTTO OTEPKA. *By William J. Gill. Arlington House. 505 pp. $8.*

HOOVER'S F.B.I.: The Men and the Myth. *By William W. Turner. Sherbourne Press. 352 pp. $7.50.*

I LIVED INSIDE THE CAMPUS REVOLUTION. *By William T. Divale with James Joseph. Cowles. 252 pp. $6.95.*

FRANK J. DONNER

Mr. Donner is the director of a research project on political surveillance at the Yale Law School. He is writing a book on that subject, which will be published in 1971 by Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

The most powerful myth in American society is a negative one: the country is under threat of a terrible, unutterable fate, "subversion." The relentless Furies, "Communists" or "subversives," who pursue us have misled and duped millions into doing their bidding. They torment us, befoul our way of life, and plot our destruction by seeking changes in government and social policy which are the treasured fruits of our special historical experience. They are the barbarians, the heretics, the enemy who mock the truth that we are a uniquely created nation. To be identified as one of them is not only politically damaging (libelous per se in many states) but a cultural stigma, a "brand of unworth." The transformation of anti-communism into *Volkskultur* explains its extraordinary hold over provincial America, precisely where Left politics, old and new, are weakest.

The main interest subversion imperils is something called "National Security," which is defended by "Freedom," a beleaguered warrior whom we are constantly arming with new and more repressive weapons. Why take chances when the struggle is to the death? Yet with all our vigilance we remain pitifully vulnerable. What are the youth rebellion, racial unrest, obscenity, war resistance, drug addiction, crime, urban decay, if not master strokes of the Old Deluder? As for protest against environmental vandalism—was it a mere accident that Earth Day was also Lenin's birthday?

The value of this myth as a political weapon can hardly be overstated. It reinforces our idea of ourselves, sanctifies our wars and validates the *status quo*. Moreover, it renews itself by associating challenges to its validity with the power of the enemy. Still, myths—especially those which legitimize the social order—can be undermined by realities. The undeniable fact that anti-communism as a mass phenomenon is rooted in affective human behavior hardly means that its power to stir response is permanent. A host of considerations, including the risk of nuclear war, the Vietnamese debacle, the breakup of monolithic world communism, and the decline in influence of domestic communism are weakening the power of the myth. Certainly to the new actors on the political stage, young persons from the Center leftward, anti-communism is the symbol of the political impotence and sterility of their elders.

The decline in the appeal of anti-communism, the fear that it may be played out as a political strategy, has mobilized a defensive regrouping of the security establishment and set in motion a drive to reinvigorate the myth with the emotions that are stirred by social and cultural change. The Nixon Administration, Attorney General Mitchell, the FBI, the Congressional anti-subversive committees, state investigative agencies and a flourishing network of anti-subversive units are joining forces to channel the energies of anti-communism into a *Kulturkampf* against an enemy who combines in one sinister stereotype all of the contemporary versions of protest and dissent. The objective is to associate political nonconformity, especially on the part of youth, with forms of behavior (drug use, innovation in sexual mores and in manners generally) which touch the most exposed social nerves. The grand strategy is not primarily to stimulate legislative sanctions that might create a libertarian backlash and run afoul of constitutional protections, but rather to encourage a grass-roots vigilante consensus, already reflected in the Kent State and Hobart College indictments.

Parenti's *The Anti-Communist Impulse* is the first sustained attempt of a social scientist to dissect anti-communism. It is an important book on a vital subject, but it is not a wholly satisfying one. The first, and more original, portion of the work seeks to isolate the images in our history and culture which have contributed to the emergence of anti-communism as an American ideology:

> . . . Historically intolerant of dissent, fearful of contamination, and addicted to the values and myths propagated by the propertied classes, Americans . . . see communism . . . as the diabolic antithesis of everything they have been taught to esteem. The Communists are despotic, we are democratic; they are collectivistic, we are individualistic; they have a controlled economy, we have free enterprise; they are "extreme," we are moderate; they are godless, we are God's children; they are alien, we are Americans; they are evil, we are virtuous.

Parenti has been unfairly criticized for lumping the manic anti-communism of the far Right with the more complex and refined versions of the creed embraced by American liberals. Parenti's point is that American liberals reinforced the blatant anti-Communist orthodoxy by refusing to oppose it on principle. The liberals insisted that they were the authentic anti-Communists and that their "extremist" opponents were misguided, crude and counter-productive in their tactics. A criticism which is better founded is that Parenti fails to make necessary distinctions between brands of liberalism: it is a travesty to stuff Owen Lattimore and Sidney Hook into the same anti-Communist bag because Lattimore, in defending himself against a Red hunt (in which, incidentally, Hook joined) pointed to some of his writing which had been critical of the Soviet Union. Parenti's reductive behavioral categories are not useful in dealing with the complex variety of liberal positions toward communism and the Soviet Union. An analysis which fails to distinguish between anti-communism as a political and cultural orthodoxy and opposition to particular Communist positions and policies is no analysis at all.

Since the early sixties, when liberal became disillusioned with the Kennedy version of America's global mission, we have seen a steady growth of self-criticism by American liberals, quickened by a recognition of the role of anti-communism in robbing liberalism of innovative power. Parenti has provided many useful leads for the elaboration of this theme, particularly in his conclusion that liberalism furnished the ideology for anti-communism and that liberals were the chief architects of an anti-Communist censensus. It is hard to quarrel with the

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thrust of Parenti's conclusion that, "Having accepted without debate the axiom that communism was a relentless, diabolic, conspiratorial force dedicated to our destruction, they [the liberals] found themselves prisoners of their own premise and were soon supporting as necessary evils policies which did violence to their best liberal instincts."

A large part of Parenti's book deals with anti-communism as a spur to American imperialism. It is sound enough, but it has been done before—by Sidney Lens, D. F. Fleming, W. A. Williams among others.

The Ordeal of Otto Otepka belongs to a sub-genre of right-wing martyrology, perfected by William F. Buckley, Jr., which may be called the paranoid threnody. Its theme is the rocklike, lonely persistence of its anti-Communist hero (archetypally, Senator McCarthy) in the face of abuse and persecution by his subversive enemies and betrayal by his professed friends. William J. Gill's Wagnerian prose makes one long for the exquisite urbanities of the Master, but there is no mistaking the book's provenance.

Despite the polemic stridency of the book, there is much for the resolute reader to learn in Gill on Otepka. Both the author and the subject provide unique insights into what may be called the security mind. Gill's hero is a veteran of the security establishment, a connoisseur of the rarest vintages of subversion. After ten years as a security investigator for the Civil Service Commission and the Navy, Otepka was appointed in 1953 to a personnel screening post by Scott McLeod, the scourge of the State Department's "security risks" during the Eisenhower administration. Otepka was a McCarthyite hatchet man and helped to write Executive Order 10450, the purge weapon of the witch hunters. During his decade-long stint as security watchdog at State, he is supposed to have conducted more loyalty screenings than any other individual in Washington. His power at State was formidable because he could destroy a career simply by delaying clearance. He also contributed to the canon—so brutally used by McCarthy against General Marshall—that a decision or policy which "helped the Communists" could retroactively serve as a basis for condemning a civil servant as a "security risk."

Otepka's "ordeal" is rooted in the attempted Kennedy administration's realignment of foreign policy from direct confrontation to a counterinsurgency strategy, ostensibly to minimize the risks of nuclear war. The Kennedys (Robert was significantly involved) proceeded to recruit a "new team" (the Bundys, Schlesinger, McNamara, Rusk, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Richard Helms) to contest Soviet penetration of the Third World by means of paramilitary and related tactics. It was a strategy which was blueprinted by American liberals and depended heavily on their cooperation and planning. The Bay of Pigs fiasco gave a strong impetus to this reorientation and forced a sharp split in policy circles in the CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department. In order to implement this strategy, important personnel changes had to be made at State.

Otepka, siding with the hard liners, balked. It was a version of a familiar struggle between modernists and fundamentalists—and Otepka was a blood-redemption fundamentalist. The struggle is rich in irony. In 1960, Robert Kennedy and Dean Rusk waited on Otepka and pleaded for clearance for W. W. Rostow, a key member of the "new team" and indeed the ideologue of counterinsurgency. Otepka refused, as he had on two earlier occasions. (It is not altogether clear why Rostow became Otepka's *bête rouge* but the author seriously suggests that a man who was named Walt Whitman and had a brother named Eugene Victor already had two strikes on his loyalty.) Thereafter, he blocked clearances for such leaders of the Eastern establishment as Andrew Cordier, Ernest A. Gross and Harding Bancroft, insisting that he could not approve their loyalty without a full field investigation by the FBI.

In October 1961, as a result of this conflict, Otepka's security operation was sharply cut and he was demoted. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, a spokesman and broker for the security establishment, responded the very next month with an investigation into State Department security practices. (As McCarthy had discovered, this is a highly productive area for the witch hunter, with enormous policy leverage.) Whether or not Otepka was the instigator of this marathon probe (it lasted more than five years; the hearings and reports appear in twenty volumes), he certainly was the subcommitee's inside man. Otepka and committee counsel Sourwine virtually wrote the scenario for the hearings. They privately traded information: Sourwine briefed Otepka on the testimony and Otepka provided useful leads and documents. When Otepka became careless and turned over raw loyalty files to Sourwine, Rusk finally had reason for dumping the man who had questioned the loyalty of some of his best friends and secretly armed the subcommittee with material to bait and humiliate him.

Otepka was fired in 1963 for "conduct unbecoming an officer of the State Department," the gravamen of the accusation being his violation of a Truman ad-

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

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ministration directive barring the transmission or disclosure of loyalty files. After lengthy departmental hearings, two civil service appeals, and a right-wing pressure campaign, supported by Senate conservatives, the charges against Otepka were upheld. In February 1969, Secretary of State Rogers refused to reinstate Otepka, and the following month he was appointed by President Nixon to the Subversive Activities Control Board, at a salary of $36,000 a year, more than twice what he had earned at his last State Department job.

The President at one stroke vindicated Otepka and began a process of resurrecting the moribund SACB. After all, Nixon's rise to power is itself a tribute to the effectiveness of the myth, and one could hardly expect him to reject his own past. Shortly thereafter, Nixon named Otepka's attorney to a place on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and more recently named to a similar post the retiring head of the Internal Security Division, Department of Justice. Attorney General Mitchell is helping along by squeezing out a few cases for presentation to the SACB. He is also preparing to submit a complete anti-subversive legislative package which will rejuvenate the SACB and offer a more expansive outlet for Otepka's talents.

The Otepka case suggests that an entrenched security bureaucracy can survive shifts in anti-Communist policy and successfully defy political control. An even clearer example of this process of institutionalization is J. Edgar Hoover's FBI, which has used its security functions to achieve autonomy by developing a direct relationship with a protective constituency.

William W. Turner, a former agent of the FBI, has written a workmanlike dissection of the Bureau and of the man who rules it. He develops in impressive detail a powerful case against the agency and its director: the authoritarian role of Hoover, his hypocritical moralizing, narcissism, bigotry, public relations gimmicks such as the FBI guided tours, the museum of relics celebrating faded exploits against Dillinger, Ma Barker, Machine Gun Kelly and similar worthies of the twenties, the grandstanding at the expense of local law enforcement, the preference for melodramatic crimes such as kidnapping and bank robbery (good publicity, and the gratitude of rich fathers and bankers is politically helpful), the failure to curb organized crime and civil rights violations, the statistical juggling to improve the FBI's paper record of achievement.

The last mentioned charge involves bureaucratic innovations developed by Hoover in order to give luster to his presentation to the House Appropriations Subcommittee: the VOT (voluntary overtime) and stolen car gambits. In order to make certain that his appropriation requests are fully honored (they always are) he informs the subcommittee that his toiling agents have worked an average of X hours of voluntary free overtime. Each year the figure rises slightly as his agents statistically slave away at their Sisyphean tasks, falling ever further behind. The continually rising VOT is a fraud. Each year a suitable figure is selected for every field office which is designed to bring the national average to the desired point, and the quota is met not by working longer hours but by doctoring time records. The necessity for an impressive statistical presentation similarly requires the kiting of the values of recovered stolen cars or claiming credit for recoveries achieved by local police. Sometimes the imperatives of the statistical game require not the padding of the annual figure in a particular category but its reduction—in order to get a head start on an improved showing for next year.

Turner's book is especially valuable because he examines aspects of the FBI's functioning which have never been adequately aired before: the agency's bureaucratic solidarity, minimizing the risk of defections; the organization of former agents which zealously promotes a climate of reverence for the agency; the tireless official efforts to suppress or neutralize criticism; the obsessive concern with image, frequently at the expense of the public interest; Hoover's maneuvers to influence local law enforcement by remote control and without taking responsibility for its failures. But the author's treatment of the internal security, anti-subversive aspects of the FBI operation is disappointing. Most of the material he cites has already appeared elsewhere and he develops no interpretive context which would justify its repetition. He fails to recognize that Hoover's entire Red-hunting operation rests on a usurped jurisdiction: it can be justified neither by a law-enforcement nor a spy-hunting mandate.

The tactics by which Hoover has bootstrapped himself into the role of anti-subversive czar are flavorfully developed in Norman Ollestad's *Inside the FBI*. Ollestad, also a former agent, reports the observations of an old FBI subversion hand:

> Why do you think the Director has a large personal following in America? Because of his reputation as a crime fighter? Hell no, crime has increased tremendously during his career. It's because he has convinced people that he stands between them and a Commie take-over in the U.S. It allows him to make comment and speak about subjects that otherwise would be out of his field. Now he can talk all about the Commie movement in civil rights, the Supreme Court decisions, the Communist speakers on U.S. college campuses, the moral, religious, political undertones of Communism. He speaks on foreign affairs. He even commented on a trade agreement with iron curtain countries . . . and a possible wheat sale to Russia. . . . Organized crime is much rougher, much more a menace to the security and well being of Americans, but the big hoods are younger, have more money, brains. I'd rather tackle the CP than the hoods.

In a recent *Time* magazine interview, Hoover denounced as a "liar" (by all odds his favorite epithet) a Princeton professor who charged that he had introduced agents on the college campus, and insisted that the "FBI is not on any campus." The fact that the FBI performs surveillance and related functions on the campus can readily be documented. In 1966, when Wesleyan students complained of FBI campus activity, Hoover did not deny the facts but wrote that their charge of violation of academic freedom was "not only false but also is so irresponsible as to cast serious doubt on the quality of academic reasoning or motivation behind it." In the following year the FBI's presence on the Brockport campus of the State University of New York brought charges of intimidation to which Hoover responded to the chancellor of the university system: "I could never permit the FBI to shirk its responsibilities. I feel certain that you, as a responsible educator and citizen, would never condone this Bureau's failure to handle its obligations in the internal security field, or that you would have us ignore specific allegations of subversive activity in any segment of our society, including college campuses."

Hoover's abuse of his critics, whether a Princeton professor or Martin Luther King, Jr., arrogant, self-righteous and irresponsible, is the product of a mind that regards any sort of criticism, however well-founded, as unpatriotic and subversive—hence immoral. It is also quite possible to explain Hoover's misrepresentations about the FBI on the campus as well as his rhetorical excesses about subversion as a resort to an established intelligence technique, "information management," which also finds expression in the secret release of dossiers to selected media outlets, the circulation of tales such as the Berrigan brothers kidnap-bombing conspiracy, or the listing of radicals on the "ten most wanted" circular because of their politics and not their crimes. In short, the national security not only shelters its guardians from criticism

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but justifies conduct which, in an open society at any rate, requires criticism. This may smack of a police state—too high a price to pay for the preservation of a myth. But we've been paying it for a long time.

In addition to campus agents, the FBI has recruited a small army of student informers, one of whom, William T. Divale, has written an "as told to" account of his life as an infiltrator of the Los Angeles area Du Bois Club and Communist Party. During his four and a half years under cover, first at a community college and then at UCLA, he filed more than 800 reports held regular conferences with his "handlers" (sometimes on campus, Mr. Hoover), and identified about 4,000 "activists" for the FBI files. To these dubious distinctions must be added another: the author publicly "fingered" Angela Davis (in the UCLA *Daily Bruin*) as a Communist.

Divale belongs to a class of informers who come to share the values of the group they infiltrate. Divale was no mere "Jimmy Higgins" or political voyeur who limited his commitment to the bare minimum required to disarm suspicion. He became a leader and a supermilitant, a role made possible by the secret knowledge that he alone among his comrades was immune from legal sanctions. Divale systematically betrayed others, but as he admitted to me when I interviewed him a few months ago, he also betrayed himself. Divale is as close as we have come in this time of vanishing innocence to types like Azeff, the Russian double agent.

The ambiguity of Divale's role, the schizoid quality of his relationships with both the hunters and the hunted, is dramatized by the manner in which he "surfaced." Divale decided to break with the FBI because he felt that he had been used and because he had become convinced that the Bureau was a politically dangerous power center. But, according to Divale, the FBI insisted on his testifying in two SACB cases against former comrades as the price of clearance. Divale claims that he agreed because he feared that his activities on the Left—even though instigated by the FBI—would be used to harass him: "From a watcher, I'd become the watched. Nor would I be the first student informer who, in working for the Bureau, had in fact worked to build his own file." Divale is candid enough to admit that this fear might well have been a rationalization of his weakness.

After the SACB performances, Divale was subpoenaed for an appearance before the Senate Internal Subcommittee which had planned to introduce into the record of his hearing, and publish, all his FBI reports. But Divale balked, sought the aid of the lawyer for the defendants in the SACB proceedings who had mercilessly cross-examined him, and refused to testify because, as he writes: "I wanted no part in driving America toward fascism."

Divale strikes me as a contemporary version of Conrad's Razumov, yearning for forgiveness, ready to confess his sins to anyone who will listen, but curiously out of touch with himself and with little understanding of the moral and political trap that closed on him. I value the book as an enlightening account of the FBI's *modus operandi* in recruiting and handling student informers. In this respect, it is really a species of counterintelligence which, I suspect, will flourish as the ranks of recanting student informers continue to grow. (There were at least four last year in addition to the author. We may yet see the emergence of a recanters' society and a new series of disillusioned confessions and exposés—this time of the FBI.) □

'What Is Right?'

FOR THE GOOD OF THE CAUSE. *By Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Translated by David Floyd and Max Hayward. With a new introduction by David Floyd. Praeger Publishers. 134 pp. $5.50. Paper $1.95.*

CHARLES LAM MARKMANN

Mr. Markmann, a frequent contributor, is a journalist, critic, novelist and translator. His latest book, The Noblest Cry *(St. Martin's Press), is a history of the American Civil Liberties Union.*

"What Is 'Right'?" was the title of the review in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* for August 31, 1963 with which Yuri Barabash opened the Soviet Government's campaign to destroy Alexander Solzhenitsyn as a writer and a man. This edition of *For the Good of the Cause*, which contains a new introduction and a lengthy appendix embodying the major Soviet reviews of the novella at the time of its appearance, not only celebrates the award of the 1970 Nobel Prize for Literature to its author but also compels us to consider once again the question that Yuri Barabash raised with malice prepense, in order to give it a specious reply.

For the problem of right and wrong is central to Solzhenitsyn's story, but not to it alone: the problem is at the heart of the attacks and defenses that have followed its publication in Russia, as it is at the heart of the unauthorized publication of Solzhenitsyn's works abroad.

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UNKNOWN SOLDIER

The courage, in steel,
is rising forever from bed,
from book, from the girdering
microscope of an absorbed mind

to careen again, deliberately,
between spiked atoms of air,

and be wounded again
by the sun's white-hot howitzers,

the blind, unblinking sun
tearing you down, turning you in
towards the accidents of earth
that become your own leaden boots
in another wheeling dance
upon the beaks of buried auks.

The courage is thought,
and we use it so rarely
to detonate our sculptured days,
our windowless tombs.

Edward Butscher

Concluding the introduction in which he resumes the history of Solzhenitsyn's literary career and personal vicissitudes, David Floyd tells something of the books on which Solzhenitsyn has been working in recent years and, after reminding us that there is no hope of their being published in the Soviet Union without major changes in that nation's policy, Floyd adds: "Even if copies of these works were to reach the West, publishers with any concern for Solzhenitsyn's fate would not dare to print them."

It would be very hard to find more apposite support for the notion that the study of literature, in the words of one writer who is also a professor of letters, Douglass Paige, is the study of the difficulties of moral choice. The moral controversies inherent in Solzhenitsyn's story have almost totally obscured consideration of this and most of his other works from the "purely literary" point of view. Admittedly, aesthetic appreciations properly so-called are possible only in an ambience in which the right of art to independent existence is conceded; and certainly that ambience has not prevailed in the Soviet Union since the disgrace of Trotsky, who was civilized enough to understand all the relations between art and revolution.

This is not to say that the moral problems are less or more important than the aesthetic, though that may well be the case. Moreover, it is not always a simple matter to separate them, especially in a system of thought in which art is to be judged by political criteria such as "Socialist realism" or "furtherance of the revolution." It is not only the attackers of Solzhenitsyn whose aesthetics, in the criticisms reprinted in this volume, are discolored by political dogma; some of his defenders as well seek to vindicate him not so much on artistic as on political and moral grounds, forgetting—if they were ever allowed to learn it—what the conventionally minded in every system must constantly be reminded of: that any subject may be fit matter for the artist, that there is no "proper" point of view from which he must regard it, that there is no social purpose binding on him, that it is myopic to identify him arbitrarily with a specific character or doctrine. Thus certain of Solzhenitsyn's champions, like all his opponents, pose and answer the question of "right" from points of departure that have relatively little to do with literature, except as they castrate it. Is it "right" to be critical of what is, or of what has been? Is it "right" to question the justice, not to mention the motives, of authorities' actions? Is it "right" to create characters with some regard to artistic integrity in preference to ideological desiderata? Such questions, which for so many seem to be antiquated intellectual gymnastics out of a more primitive epoch, are intensely and dangerously polemic in the self-styled Communist societies.

No one in the West, however, has really provided an acceptable and definitive resolution to the moral problem that arises out of what we deplore among "them": the morality of publishing here, without their authors' permission, the works of writers who are banned at home and who, by reason of such publication, may be thrust into the gravest danger. Perhaps there is no overriding single answer; each may well think he knows the right one—but right for whom? I am not speaking here of the morality of publishing such books for the mere sake of profit or scandal or political advantage, since that answers itself. Is it "right" to deprive the artist of exposure, or his audience of his work, or the world of his contributions or, of course, him of his freedom and perhaps his life?

These questions are not really too far from Solzhenitsyn's little book. Briefly, it concerns a bureaucratic decision to turn over to a new, still unborn institute, at the cost of very expensive alterations, a newly finished school built largely by its staff and its 900 students, all of whom are looking forward to its opening as to a consummation. When the party committee comes to inspect the buildings, the principal, Fyodor Mikheyevitch, is first puzzled, then vaguely alarmed—for only by indirection is he informed about what is going forward. Lidia Georgievna, one of his most dedicated teachers, cannot believe it; her first concern, like Fyodor Mikheyevitch's, is for the students who have worked and believed. The principal never thinks of merely accepting the blow. He goes for help to the local party secretary, Grachikov, who, like himself, is a humanist but who can do nothing against the local Stalincule, Knorozov, and the technocrat *manqué*, Khabalygin, who has his own bureaucratic reasons for wanting to take over the new structure. And in the end, "for the good of the cause," what is right becomes wrong; but it is clear, in spite of this "victory," that the Fyodors and the Lidias and the Grachikovs are not going to let it rest there. They are the only ones to whom it has occurred to tell the 900 students what is happening, and why.

So much for bare bones. One of the great strengths of this book is a translation that one has to remind oneself is a translation (except on the few occasions where the translators have inserted unneeded footnotes), so that it is comparable to hearing a fine symphonic poem played by an orchestra and conductor whose only purpose is to represent the work as fashioned by its creator. For this is indeed a small jewel of literary creation, and the musical comparison is not inappropriate. Solzhenitsyn opens his book with a kind of tutti—all the voices in his orchestra of students and teachers and administrators, returning to their tasks after a vacation and impatient to take possession of their new quarters, comparing vacation notes, discussing plans for the term, talking about where they will live and how much it will cost, teasing one another, boasting a little, savoring a kind of swaggering anti-intellectual technocratic barbarism that makes them indistinguishable from Podunk A&M, U.S.A., affectionately ridiculing Lidia Georgievna because she thinks they ought to learn to love the humanities. Out of this opening chorus, one by one, themes emerge and are developed in the form of characters—not the types of that Socialist realism that is simply the Muscovite version of *Main Street*. The themes meet and merge and break apart and play against one another as the characters evolve each according to his own intrinsic logic; when they react to externals, they do so not as they *should* but as they must, and so what we have is a work of art that never flaws its aesthetic integrity. One is reminded of the best Russian fiction of the 1920s.

Any tribute paid from the West to Solzhenitsyn, however, is potentially a weapon offered to his enemies at home. What then is "right"? □

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Asian Faces of Stone

ANGKOR: An Essay on Art and Imperialism. *By Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle. Translated from the Swedish by Paul Britten Austin. Pantheon Books. 167 pp. $6.95.*

JAMES GUTMANN

Mr Gutmann is professor emeritus of philosophy at Columbia University and director of University Seminars.

In the original Swedish edition of this book, it was called *Ansikte av sten*—Faces of Stone. This was, in a way, more appropriate than the present title since it emphasized Gun Kessle's share of the work. Her magnificent photographs constitute more than half the small volume, the majority occupying full pages, some of the handsomest double pages.

However, as in their previous collaboration, *Chinese Journey* and *China: The Revolution Continued*, Jan Myrdal and his wife, Gun Kessle, supplement and complement each other's work. (It is regrettable that the photographs are much less effectively reproduced than those in *Chinese Journey*, published by the same house.) Her photographs are presumably chosen to illustrate his themes:

> You stand face to face with the stone faces of Angkor. Beyond a border there is a war. But when you yourself face this stone then the "beauty" becomes a concrete reality. These faces of stone were hewn by sweating men in a bloody time of repression and revolt.

The war to which Myrdal refers raged beyond the Vietnamese border when he wrote these words; it entered Cambodia in May 1970 and engulfed Angkor before his book was published.

The best key to his interpretation of art and imperialism, it seems to me, is to be found in Jan Myrdal's *Confessions of a Disloyal European* which appeared in English two years ago. Though he looks at the faces of Angkor's stone monuments and sees in them the evidence of bloody repression by Khmer emperors a millennium ago, he still regards the contemporary imperialism of the West as "the ugliest, dirtiest, most boastful and unglorious culture the world has ever had to bear," just as he wrote in his *Confessions*. This has indeed been his conviction since the 1950s. And what he said then about the British destruction of the 15th-century architecture of the Great Mussalah in India, which led a fellow Scandinavian to accuse him of being disloyal to Europe, he now applies to the actions of the United States:

> To face Angkor and admit what one sees, then, implies a liberation from the dangerous myths of European superiority. For ideas are dangerous. They condition action. Now the villages are burning. Napalm can't be washed away. Behind the war which the rulers of the United States are waging on the villages lie economic and political motives. But also ideological ones. Reality is always overdetermined. And that's why the ideologies, too, must be crumbled to pieces.

As in his earlier work Myrdal weaves back and forth in history and combines historical analysis with personal experience. The present book begins and ends with a sleepless night which Gun Kessle recorded in her diary before starting her photography at Angkor Thom. "In the night, when Gun slept," writes Myrdal in the final paragraph of his essay, "I thought of Manhattan. Of Paris. And London. Walk down these streets a thousand years from now. How much will remain?"

It is a question which the 1,000-year-old towers and walls of Angkor might have suggested to a visitor at any time. But the date which aroused these reflections and emotions in Jan Myrdal was February 22, 1967, the day on which he records, "the United States started the heaviest offensive of the war in Vietnam in War Zone C" where "troops were flown in by helicopter and deployed along the Cambodian border."

Since Myrdal follows his characteristic method of going from contemporary to early times and from description to reflection and emotional response, his descriptions and historical accounts often have little precise reference to the photographs which they accompany; the commentary, too, is sometimes scarcely more illuminating than the most prosaic guidebook. At times it seems a parody of Baedecker:

> He [Emperor Jayavarman VII] built 102 regional hospitals, as well as a number of hospitals in cities. . . . The hospitals owned 838 villages with 81,640 working inhabitants, who delivered 11,192 tons of rice to the hospital administration every year. Further, the hospitals annually received, among much else, 4,683 pounds of sesame, 232 pounds of cinnamon, 3,402 muscatel nuts, 48,000 potions against fever, and 1,960 boxes of hemorrhoid ointment.

Perhaps Myrdal is not so much parodying Baedecker as paralleling the social scientists whose inadequacies he emphasizes in this book as he did in his


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earlier work. "In our schools," he writes, "the Nordic hen cackles and cackles. These prejudices, implanted in our children, serve but one purpose: to justify the 'Europeans' economic power over the 'colored peoples'. . . . So the prejudices must be combatted and rendered harmless." In his *Confessions* Myrdal excoriated the social scientists, the intellectuals and ideologists of the West: "We are not the bearers of consciousness. We are the whores of reason."*

It is clear that Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle's interest in Angkor does not represent retreat to ancient times or beauty or Oriental mystery. Myrdal insists that Angkor illustrates the same historico-economic processes as those visible in the West, and for him the Orient is no more mysterious than the Occident. "Cambodia has a history of its own. . . . This history follows the same laws as the history of Europe. There is nothing 'mysterious,' nothing enigmatic, about what happened at Angkor." What did happen is suggested amply enough by the fact that "these faces of stone were hewn by sweating men in a bloody time of repression and revolt."

Moreover, before they left for Cambodia, Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle "had demonstrated, written articles, made speeches against the war in Vietnam." Shortly after they returned from Angkor he "was beaten up by the police and jailed after the big demonstration in Stockholm." Far from being a moral or aesthetic holiday, for Jan Myrdal "to write on Angkor is a necessary part of the struggle for liberation." □

*Some of those who found this rhetoric excessive a few years ago may have come to think otherwise in the light of revelations of the U.S. Defense Department's involvement in Project Camelot of the American University in Washington and in the Himalayan Border Project of the University of California in Berkeley. Cf. Eric R. Wolf and Joseph G. Jorgensen, "Anthropology on the Warpath in Thailand," a special supplement in *The New York Review*, November 19, 1970. See also Gerald D. Berreman, "Academic Colonialism: Not So Innocent Abroad," in *The Nation*, November 10, 1969.

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THEATRE

HAROLD CLURMAN

A Midsummer Night's Dream is Peter Brook's masterpiece (Billy Rose Theatre). His gift is greatest in stage frolic. Eminently conscientious, he is rarely profound. He is fanciful, colorful, full of merry pranks. He addresses himself almost entirely to the eye. His production of this sweet comedy about the waywardness of love offers no literary satisfaction: it is entirely theatrical. There is little romance in it but much wonderfully bright invention.

Watching it I recalled an anecdote I once heard Henry Kahnweiler, the art dealer who first sponsored Picasso, Braque and Juan Gris, tell. Kahnweiler complimented Gris on his newest cubist painting. "But is it really a *picture*?" Gris worriedly queried. After the passage of several scenes in this production, I asked myself if what I was seeing was a brilliant studio exercise or truly a *play*. A reliable answer could only be provided by someone who had never before seen or read it. It is possible that such a person might not be able to follow the play's argument.

I suppose what disturbed me in the opening scenes was that I heard the lines faintly. The readings were not only dim but rather flat. I noticed that throughout the evening the speeches I never missed were the funny ones. Brook seemed not to be concerned with the play's verbal beauties; dwelling on them might lessen an appreciation of the jest. The loveliness of such a familiar air as, let us say, "I know a bank where the wild thyme blows . . ." etc., the tender counterpoint to the play's sport, appears to be deliberately eschewed. It would not be in tune with the production scheme or, for that matter, with the temper of the time. Glamour is gone, fun is in.

Of the composition's jocose side, full advantage has been taken, and that with nimble and coruscating mastery. In this respect Shakespeare's text not only serves as an apt scenario but as a justification for some of the play's pleasantest devices. Brook is like Puck, "the goblin" who leads the characters "up and down, up and down." A "man is but an ass, if he go about to expound this dream."

On both sides of the stage narrow ladders rise to a platform high above the stage floor, a platform with a metal railing. On this upper stage we find a small band of musicians who punctuate the action with appropriate percussive sound. Here too the actors who are engaged in the immediate scenes in progress look on and enjoy the antics of their fellow players. When we enter the theatre, we behold the play's sole scenic background —brightly lit white wooden walls on which an immense red feather is attached. This feather, later hoisted aloft, becomes Titania's couch as she lies asleep and falls victim to Oberon's stratagem.

The flower with which Oberon befuddles the various lovers is a silvery plate that can be made to rotate on a wand, a toy we occasionally have seen children play with. Coils of gleaming metal wire hanging from poles manipulated from above represent the underbrush of the woodland in which the love games take place. Oberon and Puck make their first appearance on flying trapezes which descend from the flies. Other characters—Hermia in a rage—also hang or swing hecticly on them.

Extravagant, gimmicky? Certainly, but does not Shakespeare say "All this derision shall seem a dream and fruitless vision"? The lovers' awakening is marked by the ringing of an alarm clock openly displayed by one of the "property men" on the upper stage. When an actor needs a "prop" (such as a calendar) it is thrown to him from the overhanging platform. Brook's motto here is Shakespeare's "And those things do best please me that befall preposterously."

On the nether level a guitarist supplies the sentimental strains which the actors avoid. The costumes are near-contemporary work clothes for the auxiliary players and for the rustics: Bottom and company. The highborn Athenians and the fairyland nobility wear costumes of satin, tulle or voile—their whiteness dappled with green or pink spots—making them look like pantomime Pierrots or circus clowns. Some of the scenic jokes would appear to appeal most directly to affluent "hippies" in their taste for high camp. But in general, there is a healthy exuberance.

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This then is a director's rather than an actors' triumphal occasion, except to the extent that the actors are his enthusiastic coadjutors. A youngish, physically well-trained company is bold and agile in movement, sometimes performing acrobatic tricks to superb comic effect. There are dull spots only when laughs are not in order.

Standing out above the company's general competence and good will are David Waller as an authentically humorous and robust Bottom, and the lanky Frances De La Tour as the "painted maypole," Helena, whose every word is funny as well as distinct. Patrick Stewart is a charmingly simple-minded Snout, and little Hermia is well played by pretty Mary Rutherford in her tantrums, though not wholly audible at other times.

Many questions occurred to me as I followed the show, and after I had left I wanted to see it all over again—which I shall probably do in the coming weeks of its limited engagement. That is a tribute to Peter Brook whose *Marat-Sade* and *King Lear* also aroused the desire for renewed acquaintance. Thinking back on these earlier—always interesting—productions, my feeling is that while *King Lear* was most gravely committed to an interpretation of its text (though not altogether satisfactory to me as such) and *Marat-Sade* so devoted to directorial virtuosity that its substance became subservient to it, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is archetypal of Brook's talent at its most gratifying.

But to return to the questions. It is a good thing that so much emphasis nowadays is put on the quality and originality of theatrical staging; yet one wonders if this is not due, in part, to the paucity of significant new scripts. This production will undoubtedly inspire ambitious theatre folk, but will it not also turn them to much frivolous imitation, more manner than matter? And why does the new stagecraft one hears so much about apply itself mainly to old texts and not evolve new ones? We are constantly required to determine how the classics have been "treated" rather than to judge an organically created work. The marriage of writing and stage work into a true unity has chiefly occurred in recent years only in such productions as Brecht's *Mother Courage*. But consummations of this sort are likely to occur only when truly total theatres are established; where writers, directors, actors, designers are partners who speak together on subjects about which they harbor strong mutual feeling.

These afterthoughts are not for the moment at issue. The simple fact is that Brook's latest production is a signal piece of theatre work in the English-speaking theatre of our day. It will be hugely enjoyed by many, it may puzzle some, it will be condemned by very few —I think wrongly. But there is no doubt that it should be seen by everyone eager for fresh theatre experiences.

No, No, Nanette the 1925 musical, chiefly by *Tea-for-Two* Otto Harbach and Vincent Youmans, is now a smash hit at the 46th Street Theatre. Its cast is notable for Bobby Van's trimly cool and expert dancing, Patsy Kelly's brash comic sense, Ruby Keeler's encouraging longevity as a hoofer, Helen Gallagher's handsome proficiency. As to the event as a whole . . . I have no words! □

ART

LAWRENCE ALLOWAY

The history of the New York Cultural Center, which is currently showing its best exhibition, is curious. It started in 1964 as Huntington Hartford's Gallery of Modern Art and went into immediate obscurity. Recently, Fairleigh Dickinson University accepted the building and appointed Donald Karshan as director last year. He has provided a hectic schedule of exhibitions, despite an evident shortage of funds which even forced him to use a Museum of Modern Art traveling show, designed for the Styx, at his marble place on Columbus Circle in New York.

Mr. Karshan is a print collector and the new show, originated by him, reveals a neglected venture in 19th-century print making, *L'Estampe Originale*. It consists of ninety-five original graphics, published for subscribers in nine albums between 1893 and 1895. Karshan has prepared a *catalogue raisonné* of the prints, providing a solid documentary context for a most handsome exhibit. The show (until February 14) is a microcosm of the going styles of the period. Impressionism is represented by Camille Pissarro and Renoir, Neo-Impressionism by Signac and Theo van Rysselberghe, Post-Impressionism by Toulouse-Lautrec, the *Nabis* by Bonnard, Roussel and Vuillard, primitivism by Emile Bernard, tenebrism by Eugene Carrière and Joseph Pennell, mild academism by Fantin-Latour and Albert Bresnard, and caricature by Adolphe Willette. Phases of social comment appear in C-E. Meunier's noble proletarian profile of a "Miner," in Félix Vallotton's "Demonstration" (fight and flight in the street), H. H. Ibels' study of physical labor, "The Street Pavers," and Eugene Grasset's extraordinary "Vitriol-

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thrower," an Art Nouveau Medusa of the streets. And there are two superb Redon lithographs.

There are two more or less separate kinds of prints. On one hand are prints done by artists and readily indentifiable as Art because of their relation to the artist's regular style in other media. In the present show, Gauguin's strong lithograph "Manao Tupapau," based on a painting, is an example of this type—indisputably art. On the other hand, the then new medium of lithography was used for commercial posters too, sometimes done by specialists in the genre, sometimes by visiting artists. In this form graphic art maintains its connection with popular culture rather than with artistic tradition. Georges de Peure's "The Source of Evil," for instance, entwines nude woman and poppy, taking a decadent theme but handling it with the aplomb of poster design. Willette's "Pierrot pendu" derives its bizarre image from book illustration—a girl with bared breasts laughing at a suicide dangling outside her window. As artists lost their imagery of martyrdoms and classical battle, popular culture provided analogous sensations. Jules Chéret, the founder of the Art Nouveau poster, is represented in *L'Estampe Originale* by one of his floating-dancing figure groups. Seen in the context of original, i.e., fine art, prints, without the usual lettering, his figures suddenly declare their source in late rococo ceiling and wall paintings. This fluctuation between the traditions of fine art and of popular culture is one of the pleasures of late 19th-century prints.

The art critic Roger Marx wrote a preface for the original set in which he defended the range of contributors to the albums. He mentions the aesthetic arguments of the 19th century between "classics, romantics and realists," dismisses them as inconclusive, and warns against "all doctrines which aspire to limit the field of action of the innovator and impose rules on genius." He is broad-minded on behalf of an improvisatory verve and freshness of drawing that he sees as beyond style, but his point can be extended to serve as a justification of stylistic multiplicity as such. Mr. Karshan does not welcome this generosity and considers the lesser-known artists to be mostly well-forgotten. To stop art history from getting too crowded he sets up as tests of greatness "abstracted monumentality" and "spiritual ambiguity," the lack of which keeps an artist out of the big time.

In fact, forgotten or half-forgotten artists cannot be disposed of so easily, and this show is a good occasion to consider the problem of their numbers. It occurs naturally here because Huntington Hartford's initial purpose in putting up the building was to devote it to modern academic art and reveal by contrast the hollowness of abstraction. It is hard to sustain a museum on the basis of a gesture of indignation, and he didn't. If he had gone about it seriously, however, the idea was sound, inasmuch as the art history of the recent past has been prematurely streamlined. To say this is not to attack modern art, as Hartford would want to, but to give the received styles of modern art more company, however unwelcome to entrenched artists and their supporters. One way of doing this is by an amplified account of all contemporaneous tendencies. *L'Estampe Originale*, with its solid stratum of less well-known artists (Auriol, Boutet, Dulac, Goeneutte, Guilloux, Jossot, Lunois, Georges Henri Pissarro, Raffaelli, Renouard, Somm, Wagner) is a reminder of this undefined realm. A very narrow view of art has dominated our eyes and minds since at least 1920 when Roger Fry published *Vision and Design*, in which the revolutionary exclusions of early modern artists have become a system of exclusive aesthetics.

What is needed is an art history which is seen from more than one point of view and an art criticism which is as interested in representative works as it is in masterpieces. The concept of the masterpiece has been much used to spare us wider inquiries, for once the masterpieces of a man or a period are defined, why bother with less? Greatness is repressive as a criterion of art criticism. Art writing by now has recorded sufficient major shifts in taste and attention to show that forgetfulness can take over all reputations and, equally, that revival can come to anybody.

Research is now widening in such areas as the academics of the same period as the Impressionists, the following generation of academics who incorporated aspects of Impressionism, the painterly styles of salon art in general, and, in the 20th century, the figurative artists whose work paralleled the development of abstraction. The art of the WPA, previously regarded as the mute prelude of Abstract Expressionism, is now being studied for its own properties. A wholesale revision of the art history of the past hundred years is in order, whether by establishing a more complex history or by applying a more broad-based definition of art to recent styles. □

MOUNTAIN DREAMS

There are whole weeks
when I dream of mountains
sometimes climbing them
sometimes being the mountain
being climbed

At the top I find
growing from my highest crags
a single dark flower

When I pick the flower
I fall off the mountain
when the flower is picked
I crumble into dust

all for a simple Hungarian flower
for an African mountain
for a morning when I wake
tasting dust
and hearing the ocean in all my ears

Joseph Bruchac

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Crossword Puzzle No. 1380

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

8 What American girls reportedly might be doing in Italy, if in somewhat straitened circumstances. (7,3,5)

9 One might so swear the students should be so occupied at end of term. (6)

10 Alert before them, probably. (3,5)

11 Insect food? (4)

13 Perhaps cape, diadem and staff associations with one. (4-2-4)

15 Not good times, though you shouldn't work on them. (3-4)

16 Start a keg while the sailor goes to fish. (7)

19 What spanners might be used for in your mouth? (10)

21 Separate kind? (4)

22 Ever stop to go beyond this? (8)

24 Was Quasimodo unfair competition? (6)

26 The savings of a shopper (though questionable) hinges on the contents? (5,10)

DOWN

1 It implies middling seriousness takes a special kind of pull. (6,2,7)

2 and 14 down Downhearted and irritable? This could take care of some of your physical problems. (4,5)

3 Not a regular boyfriend evidently—perhaps have trouble with his 1 down. (8)

4 Runs ashore pearls, perhaps. (7)

5 Possibly the writer has a staff to create a youthful literary character. (6)

6 Singer eager to rise? (4)

7 Not necessarily enjoyed by plebes on liberty, although the faculty might expect it. (8,7)

12 Portended the color of the uniforms in place of repose. (5)

14 See 2 down

17 Are bikes so badly constructed? Rolls there possibly, however. (8)

18 Make book, perhaps. (7)

20 Be very attractive. (6)

23 Rear connection between levels. (4)

25 As a last course, knock out the return (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1379

ACROSS: 1 Superscribe; 9 Shadowed; 10 Glower; 11 Arrears; 12 Smudges; 14 Myosis; 15 Windlass; 17 Handgrip; 20 Puffed; 24 Assyria; 27 Erastian; 28 Constructed. DOWN: 2 Undressed; 3 Edwards; 4 and 13 Sideswipe; 5 Regimen; 6 and 22 Bloodthirsty; 7 Thrift; 8 Defers; 16 Lafayette; 18 Aphids; 19 Retorts; 20 Passaic; 21 Elijah; 23 Ratio; 25 and 26 Dear Editor.

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